# 1nc

### 1

#### The affirmative’s failure to advance a topical defense of federal policy undermines debate’s transformative and intellectual potential

#### Everything after the colon matters.

Webster’s Guide to Grammar and Writing – 2000 <http://ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/marks/colon.htm>

Use of a colon before a list or an explanation that is preceded by a clause that can stand by itself. Think of the colon as a gate, inviting one to go on… If the introductory phrase preceding the colon is very brief and the clause following the colon represents the real business of the sentence, begin the clause after the colon with a capital letter.

#### “Resolved” expresses intent to implement the plan

American Heritage Dictionary 2000 [www.dictionary.com/cgi-bin/dict.pl?term=resolved](http://www.dictionary.com/cgi-bin/dict.pl?term=resolved)

To find a solution to; solve …To bring to a usually successful conclusion

#### “Should” denotes an expectation of that

American Heritage Dictionary – 2000 [www.dictionary.com]

3 Used to express probability or expectation

#### “The USFG” is the government in Washington D.C.

Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia 2000 [http://encarta.msn.com]

“The federal government of the United States is centered in Washington DC.”

#### A limited topic of discussion that provides for equitable ground is key to productive inculcation of decision-making and advocacy skills in every and all facets of life---even if their position is contestable that’s distinct from it being valuably debatable---this still provides room for flexibility, creativity, and innovation, but targets the discussion to avoid mere statements of fact---T debates also solve any possible turn

Steinberg & Freeley 8 \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp45-

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### First, political simulations are good for education, decision-making skills, and empathy – Defined rules, a stable topic, and institutional role playing are key

Lantis 8 (Jeffrey S. Lantis is Professor in the Department of Political Science and Chair of the

International Relations Program at The College of Wooster, “The State of the Active Teaching and Learning Literature”, <http://www.isacompss.com/info/samples/thestateoftheactiveteachingandlearningliterature_sample.pdf>)

**Simulations**, games, **and role-play** represent a third important set of active teaching and learning approaches. Educational objectives include deepening conceptual understandings of a particular phenomenon, sets of interactions, or socio-political processes by using student interaction to bring **abstract concepts to life**. They provide students with a real or imaginary environment within which to act out a given situation (Crookall 1995; Kaarbo and Lantis 1997; Kaufman 1998; Jefferson 1999; Flynn 2000; Newmann and Twigg 2000; Thomas 2002; Shellman and Turan 2003; Hobbs and Moreno 2004; Wheeler 2006; Kanner 2007; Raymond and Sorensen 2008). The aim is to enable students to **actively experience**, rather than read or hear about, the “constraints and motivations for action (or inaction) experienced by real players” (Smith and Boyer 1996:691), or to think about what they might do in a particular situation that the instructor has dramatized for them. As Sutcliffe (2002:3) emphasizes, “Remote theoretical concepts can be given life by placing them in a situation with which students are familiar.” Such exercises capitalize on the strengths of active learning techniques: creating memorable experiential learning events that tap into multiple senses and emotions by utilizing visual and verbal stimuli. Early examples of simulations scholarship include works by Harold Guetzkow and colleagues, who created the Inter-Nation Simulation (INS) in the 1950s. This work sparked wider interest in political simulations as teaching and research tools. By the 1980s, scholars had accumulated a number of sophisticated simulations of international politics, with names like “Crisis,” “Grand Strategy,” “ICONS,” and “SALT III.” More recent literature on simulations stresses opportunities to reflect dynamics faced in the real world by individual decision makers, by small groups like the US National Security Council, or even global summits organized around international issues, and provides for a focus on contemporary global problems (Lantis et al. 2000; Boyer 2000). Some of the most popular simulations involve modeling international organizations, in particular United Nations and European Union simulations (Van Dyke et al. 2000; McIntosh 2001; Dunn 2002; Zeff 2003; Switky 2004; Chasek 2005). Simulations may be employed in one class meeting, through one week, or even over an entire semester. Alternatively, they may be designed to take place outside of the classroom in local, national, or international competitions. The scholarship on the use of games in international studies sets these approaches apart slightly from simulations. For example, Van Ments (1989:14) argues that **games are structured systems of competitive play** with **specific defined endpoints** or solutions that incorporate the material to be learnt. They are similar to simulations, but contain **specific structures or rules** that dictate **what it means to “win**” the simulated interactions. Games place the participants in positions to make choices that 10 affect outcomes, but do not require that they take on the persona of a real world actor. Examples range from interactive prisoner dilemma exercises to the use of board games in international studies classes (Hart and Simon 1988; Marks 1998; Brauer and Delemeester 2001; Ender 2004; Asal 2005; Ehrhardt 2008) A final subset of this type of approach is the role-play. Like simulations, roleplay places students within a structured environment and asks them to take on a specific role. Role-plays differ from simulations in that rather than having their actions prescribed by a set of well-defined preferences or objectives, role-plays provide more leeway for students to think about how they might act when placed in the position of their slightly less well-defined persona (Sutcliffe 2002). Role-play allows students to create their own interpretation of the roles because of role-play’s less “goal oriented” focus. The primary aim of the role-play is to dramatize for the students the relative positions of the actors involved and/or the challenges facing them (Andrianoff and Levine 2002). This dramatization can be very simple (such as roleplaying a two-person conversation) or complex (such as role-playing numerous actors interconnected within a network). The reality of the scenario and its proximity to a student’s personal experience is also flexible. While few examples of effective roleplay that are clearly distinguished from simulations or games have been published, some recent work has laid out some very useful role-play exercises with clear procedures for use in the **international studies classroom** (Syler et al. 1997; Alden 1999; Johnston 2003; Krain and Shadle 2006; Williams 2006; Belloni 2008). Taken as a whole, the applications and procedures for simulations, games, and role-play are well detailed in the active teaching and learning literature. Experts recommend a set of core considerations that should be taken into account when designing effective simulations (Winham 1991; Smith and Boyer 1996; Lantis 1998; Shaw 2004; 2006; Asal and Blake 2006; Ellington et al. 2006). These include building the simulation design around **specific educational objectives**, carefully selecting the situation or topic to be addressed, establishing the needed roles to be played by both students and instructor, providing clear rules, specific instructions and background material, and having debriefing and assessment plans in place in advance. There are also an increasing number of simulation designs published and disseminated in the discipline, whose procedures can be adopted (or adapted for use) depending upon an instructor’s educational objectives (Beriker and Druckman 1996; Lantis 1996; 1998; Lowry 1999; Boyer 2000; Kille 2002; Shaw 2004; Switky and Aviles 2007; Tessman 2007; Kelle 2008). Finally, there is growing attention in this literature to assessment. Scholars have found that these methods are particularly effective in bridging the gap between academic knowledge and everyday life. Such exercises also lead to **enhanced student interest** in the topic, the development of **empathy**, and **acquisition and retention** of **knowledge**.

#### Secod, their critique must engage the state – Their characterizations of the state are too totalizing – Kills coalitions and cedes politics to authoritarian groups

Mouffe 2009 (Chantal Mouffe is Professor of Political Theory at the Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster, “The Importance of Engaging the State”, *What is Radical Politics Today?*, Edited by Jonathan Pugh, pp. 233-7)

In both Hardt and Negri, and Virno, there is therefore emphasis upon ‘critique as withdrawal’. They all call for the development of a non-state public sphere. They call for self-organisation, experimentation, non-representative and extra-parliamentary politics. They see forms of traditional representative politics as **inherently oppressive**. So they do not seek to engage with them, in order to challenge them. They seek to get rid of them altogether. This disengagement is, for such influential personalities in radical politics today, the key to every political position in the world. The Multitude must recognise imperial sovereignty itself as the enemy and discover adequate means of subverting its power. Whereas in the disciplinary era I spoke about earlier, sabotage was the fundamental form of political resistance, these authors claim that, today, it should be desertion. It is indeed through desertion, through the evacuation of the places of power, that they think that battles against Empire might be won. Desertion and exodus are, for these important thinkers, a powerful form of class struggle against imperial postmodernity. According to Hardt and Negri, and Virno, radical politics in the past was dominated by the notion of ‘the people’. This was, according to them, a unity, acting with one will. And this unity is linked to the existence of the state. The Multitude, on the contrary, shuns political unity. It is not representable because it is an active self-organising agent that can never achieve the status of a juridical personage. It can never converge in a general will, because the present globalisation of capital and workers’ struggles will not permit this. It is anti-state and anti-popular. Hardt and Negri claim that the Multitude cannot be conceived any more in terms of a sovereign authority that is representative of the people. They therefore argue that new forms of politics, which are non-representative, are needed. They advocate a **withdrawal from existing institutions**. This is something which characterises much of radical politics today. The emphasis is not upon challenging the state. Radical politics today is often characterised by a mood, a sense and a feeling, that the state itself is inherently the problem. Critique as engagement I will now turn to presenting the way I envisage the form of social criticism best suited to radical politics today. I agree with Hardt and Negri that it is important to understand the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism. But I consider that the dynamics of this transition is better apprehended within the framework of the approach outlined in the book Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001). What I want to stress is that many factors have contributed to this transition from Fordism to post-Fordism, and that it is necessary to recognise its complex nature. My problem with Hardt and Negri’s view is that, by putting so much emphasis on the workers’ struggles, they tend to see this transition as if it was driven by one single logic: the workers’ resistance to the forces of capitalism in the post-Fordist era. They put too much emphasis upon immaterial labour. In their view, capitalism can only be reactive and they refuse to accept the creative role played both by capital and by labour. To put it another way, they deny the positive role of political struggle. In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics we use the word ‘hegemony’ to describe the way in which meaning is given to institutions or practices: for example, the way in which a given institution or practice is defined as ‘oppressive to women’, ‘racist’ or ‘environmentally destructive’. We also point out that every hegemonic order is therefore susceptible to being challenged by counter-hegemonic practices – feminist, anti-racist, environmentalist, for example. This is illustrated by the plethora of new social movements which presently exist in radical politics today (Christian, anti-war, counter-globalisation, Muslim, and so on). Clearly not all of these are workers’ struggles. In their various ways they have nevertheless attempted to influence and have influenced a new hegemonic order. This means that when we talk about ‘the political’, we do not lose sight of the ever present possibility of heterogeneity and antagonism within society. There are many different ways of being antagonistic to a dominant order in a heterogeneous society – it need not only refer to the workers’ struggles. I submit that it is necessary to introduce this hegemonic dimension when one envisages the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism. This means abandoning the view that a single logic (workers’ struggles) is at work in the evolution of the work process; as well as acknowledging the pro-active role played by capital. In order to do this we can find interesting insights in the work of Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello who, in their book The New Spirit of Capitalism (2005), bring to light the way in which capitalists manage to use the demands for autonomy of the new movements that developed in the 1960s, harnessing them in the development of the post-Fordist networked economy and transforming them into new forms of control. They use the term ‘artistic critique’ to refer to how the strategies of the counter-culture (the search for authenticity, the ideal of selfmanagement and the anti-hierarchical exigency) were used to promote the conditions required by the new mode of capitalist regulation, replacing the disciplinary framework characteristic of the Fordist period. From my point of view, what is interesting in this approach is that it shows how an important dimension of the transition from Fordism to post- Fordism involves rearticulating existing discourses and practices in new ways. It allows us to visualise the transition from Fordism to post- Fordism in terms of a hegemonic intervention. To be sure, Boltanski and Chiapello never use this vocabulary, but their analysis is a clear example of what Gramsci called ‘hegemony through neutralisation’ or ‘passive revolution’. This refers to a situation where demands which challenge the hegemonic order are **recuperated** by the existing system, which is achieved by **satisfying them** in a way that **neutralises their subversive potential**. When we apprehend the transition from Fordism to post- Fordism within such a framework, we can understand it as a hegemonic move by capital to re-establish its leading role and restore its challenged legitimacy. We did not witness a revolution, in Marx’s sense of the term. Rather, there have been many different interventions, challenging dominant hegemonic practices. It is clear that, once we envisage **social reality in terms of ‘hegemonic’ and ‘counter-hegemonic’ practices, radical politics is not about withdrawing** completely from existing institutions. Rather, we have **no other choice** but to **engage with hegemonic practices**, in order **to challenge them**. This is crucial; otherwise we will be faced with a chaotic situation. Moreover, if we do not engage with and challenge the existing order, if we instead choose to simply escape the state completely, we **leave the door open** for others to take control of systems of authority and regulation. Indeed there are many historical (and not so historical) examples of this. When the Left shows little interest, Right-wing and authoritarian groups are only too **happy to take over** the state. The strategy of exodus could be seen as the reformulation of the idea of communism, as it was found in Marx. There are many points in common between the two perspectives. To be sure, for Hardt and Negri it is no longer the proletariat, but the Multitude which is the privileged political subject. But in both cases the state is seen as a **monolithic apparatus** of domination that **cannot be transformed**. It has to ‘wither away’ in order to leave room for a reconciled society beyond law, power and sovereignty. In reality, as I’ve already noted, others are often perfectly willing to take control. If my approach – supporting new social movements and counterhegemonic practices – has been called ‘post-Marxist’ by many, it is precisely because I have challenged the very possibility of such a reconciled society. To acknowledge the ever present possibility of antagonism to the existing order implies recognising that heterogeneity cannot be eliminated. As far as politics is concerned, this means the need to envisage it in terms of a hegemonic struggle between conflicting hegemonic projects attempting to incarnate the universal and to define the symbolic parameters of social life. A successful hegemony fixes the meaning of institutions and social practices and defines the ‘common sense’ through which a given conception of reality is established. However, such a result is always contingent, precarious and susceptible to being challenged by counter-hegemonic interventions. Politics always takes place in a field criss-crossed by antagonisms. A properly political intervention is always one that engages with a certain aspect of the existing hegemony. It can never be merely oppositional or conceived as desertion, because it aims to challenge the existing order, so that it may reidentify and feel more comfortable with that order. Another important aspect of a hegemonic politics lies in establishing linkages between various demands (such as environmentalists, feminists, anti-racist groups), so as to transform them into claims that will challenge the existing structure of power relations. This is a further reason why **critique involves engagement**, rather than disengagement. It is clear that the different demands that exist in our societies are often in conflict with each other. This is why they need to be **articulated politically**, which obviously involves the creation of a collective will, a ‘we’. This, in turn, requires the determination of a ‘them’. This obvious and simple point is missed by the various advocates of the Multitude. For they seem to believe that the Multitude possesses a natural unity which does not need political articulation. Hardt and Negri see ‘the People’ as homogeneous and expressed in a unitary general will, rather than divided by different political conflicts. Counter-hegemonic practices, by contrast, do not eliminate differences. Rather, they are what could be called an ‘ensemble of differences’, all coming together, only at a given moment, against a common adversary. Such as when different groups from many backgrounds come together to protest against a war perpetuated by a state, or when environmentalists, feminists, anti-racists and others come together to challenge dominant models of development and progress. In these cases, the adversary **cannot be defined in broad** general **terms** like ‘Empire’, or for that matter ‘Capitalism’. It is instead contingent upon the particular circumstances in question – the specific states, international institutions or **governmental practices** that are **to be challenged**. Put another way, the construction of political demands is dependent upon the specific relations of power that need to be targeted and transformed, in order to create the conditions for a new hegemony. This is clearly not an exodus from politics. It is not ‘critique as withdrawal’, but ‘critique as engagement’. It is a ‘war of position’ that needs to be launched, often across a range of sites, involving the coming together of a range of interests. This can only be done by establishing links between social movements, political parties and trade unions, for example. The aim is to create a common bond and collective will, engaging with a wide range of sites, and often institutions, with the aim of transforming them. This, in my view, is how we should conceive the nature of radical politics.

#### Third, they can’t access their deliberation bad offense --- Dialogue is critical to affirming any value—shutting down deliberation devolves into totalitarianism and reinscribes oppression

Morson 4

http://www.flt.uae.ac.ma/elhirech/baktine/0521831059.pdf#page=331

Northwestern Professor, Prof. Morson's work ranges over a variety of areas: literary theory (especially narrative); the history of ideas, both Russian and European; a variety of literary genres (especially satire, utopia, and the novel); and his favorite writers -- Chekhov, Gogol, and, above all, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy. He is especially interested in the relation of literature to philosophy.

 Bakhtin viewed the whole process of “ideological” (in the sense of ideas and values, however unsystematic) development as an endless dialogue. As teachers, we find it difficult to avoid a voice of authority, however much we may think of ours as the rebel’s voice, because our rebelliousness against society at large speaks in the authoritative voice of our subculture.We speak the language and thoughts of academic educators, even when we imagine we are speaking in no jargon at all, and that jargon, inaudible to us, sounds with all the overtones of authority to our students. We are so prone to think of ourselves as fighting oppression that it takes some work to realize that we ourselves may be felt as oppressive and overbearing, and that our own voice may provoke the same reactions that we feel when we hear an authoritative voice with which we disagree. So it is often helpful to think back on the great authoritative oppressors and reconstruct their self-image: helpful, but often painful. I remember, many years ago, when, as a recent student rebel and activist, I taught a course on “The Theme of the Rebel” and discovered, to my considerable chagrin, that many of the great rebels of history were the very same people as the great oppressors. There is a famous exchange between Erasmus and Luther, who hoped to bring the great Dutch humanist over to the Reformation, but Erasmus kept asking Luther how he could be so certain of so many doctrinal points. We must accept a few things to be Christians at all, Erasmus wrote, but surely beyond that there must be room for us highly fallible beings to disagree. Luther would have none of such tentativeness. He knew, he was sure. The Protestant rebels were, for a while, far more intolerant than their orthodox opponents. Often enough, the oppressors are the ones who present themselves and really think of themselves as liberators. Certainty that one knows the root cause of evil: isn’t that itself often the root cause? We know from Tsar Ivan the Terrible’s letters denouncing Prince Kurbsky, a general who escaped to Poland, that Ivan saw himself as someone who had been oppressed by noblemen as a child and pictured himself as the great rebel against traditional authority when he killed masses of people or destroyed whole towns. There is something in the nature of maximal rebellion against authority that produces ever greater intolerance, unless one is very careful. For the skills of fighting or refuting an oppressive power are not those of openness, self-skepticism, or real dialogue. In preparing for my course, I remember my dismay at reading Hitler’s Mein Kampf and discovering that his self-consciousness was precisely that of the rebel speaking in the name of oppressed Germans, and that much of his amazing appeal – otherwise so inexplicable – was to the German sense that they were rebelling victims. In our time, the Serbian Communist and nationalist leader Slobodan Milosevic exploited much the same appeal. Bakhtin surely knew that Communist totalitarianism, the Gulag, and the unprecedented censorship were constructed by rebels who had come to power. His favorite writer, Dostoevsky, used to emphasize that the worst oppression comes from those who, with the rebellious psychology of “the insulted and humiliated,” have seized power – unless they have somehow cultivated the value of dialogue, as Lenin surely had not, but which Eva, in the essay by Knoeller about teaching The Autobiography of Malcolm X, surely had. Rebels often make the worst tyrants because their word, the voice they hear in their consciousness, has borrowed something crucial from the authoritative word it opposed, and perhaps exaggerated it: the aura of righteous authority. If one’s ideological becoming is understood as a struggle in which one has at last achieved the truth, one is likely to want to impose that truth with maximal authority; and rebels of the next generation may proceed in much the same way, in an ongoing spiral of intolerance.

#### Their deliberation offense doesn’t assume the game-value of the activity where rules and procedures govern the decision-making purpose of the ballot ---- Keeping debate as a game-activity is biggest internal link to all other benefits of debate

Tonn ‘05

(Mari Boor, Professor of Communication – University of Maryland, “Taking Conversation, Dialogue, and Therapy Public”, *Rhetoric & Public Affairs*, Vol. 8, Issue 3, Fall)

Perhaps the most conspicuous effort at replacing public debate with therapeutic dialogue was President Clinton's Conversation on Race, launched in mid-1997. Controversial from its inception for its ideological bent, the initiative met further widespread criticism for its encounter-group approaches to racial stratification and strife, critiques echoing previously articulated concerns- my own among them6-that certain dangers lurk in employing private or social communication modes for public problem-solving.7 Since then, others have joined in contesting the treating of public problems with narrative and psychological approaches, which-in the name of promoting civility, cooperation, personal empowerment, and socially constructed or idiosyncratic truths-actually work to **contain dissent**, locate systemic social problems **solely within individual neurosis**, and otherwise **fortify hegemony**.8 Particularly noteworthy is Michael Schudson's challenge to the utopian equating of "conversation" with the "soul of democracy." Schudson points to pivotal differences in the goals and architecture of conversational and democratic deliberative processes. To him, political (or democratic) conversation is a contradiction in terms. Political deliberation entails a clear instrumental purpose, ideally remaining ever mindful of its implications beyond an individual case. Marked by disagreement-even pain-democratic deliberation contains **transparent prescribed procedures** **governing** participation and **decision making** so as to protect the timid or otherwise weak. In such processes, written records chronicle the interactional journey toward resolution, and in the case of writing law especially, provide accessible justification for decisions rendered. In sharp contrast, conversation is often "small talk" exchanged among family, friends, or candidates for intimacy, unbridled by set agendas, and prone to egocentric rather than altruistic goals. **Subject only to unstated "rules**" such as turn-taking and politeness, conversation tends to advantage the gregarious or articulate over the shy or slight of tongue.9 The events of 9/11, the onset of war with Afghanistan and Iraq, and the subsequent failure to locate Iraqi weapons of mass destruction have resuscitated some faith in debate, argument, warrant, and facts as **crucial to the public sphere**. Still, the romance with public conversation persists. As examples among communication scholars, Karlyn Kohrs Campbell's 2001 Carroll C. Arnold Distinguished Lecture treated what she termed "the rhetoric of conversation" as a means to "manage controversy" and empower non-dominant voices10; multiple essays in a 2002 special issue of Rhetoric & Public Affairs on deliberative democracy couch a deliberative democratic ideal in dialogic terms11; and the 2005 Southern States Communication Convention featured family therapist Sallyann Roth, founding member and trainer of the Public Conversations Project, as keynote speaker.12 Representative of the dialogic turn in deliberative democracy scholarship is Gerard A. Hauser and Chantal Benoit-Barne's critique of the traditional procedural, reasoning model of public problem solving: "A deliberative model of democracy . . . constru[es] democracy in terms of participation in the ongoing conversation about how we shall act and interact-our political relations" and "Civil society redirects our attention to the language of social dialogue on which our understanding of political interests and possibility rests."13 And on the political front, British Prime Minister Tony Blair-facing declining poll numbers and mounting criticism of his indifference to public opinion on issues ranging from the Iraq war to steep tuition hike proposals-launched The Big Conversation on November 28, 2003. Trumpeted as "as way of enriching the Labour Party's policy making process by listening to the British public about their priorities," the initiative includes an interactive government website and community meetings ostensibly designed to solicit citizens' voices on public issues.14 In their own way, each treatment of public conversation positions it as a democratic good, a mode that heals divisions and carves out spaces wherein ordinary voices can be heard. In certain ways, Schudson's initial reluctance to dismiss public conversation echoes my own early reservations, given the ideals of egalitarianism, empowerment, and mutual respect conversational advocates champion. Still, in the spirit of the dialectic ostensibly underlying dialogic premises, this essay argues that various negative consequences can result from transporting conversational and therapeutic paradigms into public problem solving. In what follows, I extend Schudson's critique of a conversational model for democracy in two ways: First, whereas Schudson primarily offers a theoretical analysis, I interrogate public conversation as a praxis in a variety of venues, illustrating how public "conversation" and "dialogue" have been **coopted to silence rather than empower** marginalized or dissenting voices. In practice, public conversation easily can emulate what feminist political scientist Jo Freeman termed "the **tyranny of structurelessness**" in her classic 1970 critique of consciousness- raising groups in the women's liberation movement,15 as well as the key traits Irving L. Janis ascribes to "groupthink."16 Thus, contrary to its promotion as a means to neutralize hierarchy and exclusion in the public sphere, public conversation can and has **accomplished the reverse**. When such moves are rendered transparent, public conversation and dialogue, I contend, risk increasing rather than diminishing **political cynicism and alienation**. **[Continues…]** This widespread recognition that access to public deliberative processes and the ballot is a baseline of any genuine democracy points to the most curious irony of the conversation movement: portions of its constituency. Numbering among the most fervid dialogic loyalists have been some feminists and multiculturalists who represent groups historically denied both the right to speak in public and the ballot. Oddly, some feminists who championed the slogan "The Personal Is Political" to emphasize ways relational power can oppress tend to ignore similar dangers lurking in the appropriation of conversation and dialogue in public deliberation. Yet the conversational model's emphasis on empowerment through intimacy can duplicate the power networks that traditionally excluded females and nonwhites and gave rise to numerous, sometimes necessarily uncivil, demands for democratic inclusion. Formalized participation structures in deliberative processes obviously cannot ensure the elimination of relational power blocs, but, as Freeman pointed out, the absence of formal rules leaves relational power **unchecked and** potentially **capricious**. Moreover, the privileging of the self, personal experiences, and individual perspectives of reality intrinsic in the conversational paradigm mirrors justifications once used by dominant groups who used their own lives, beliefs, and interests as templates for hegemonic social premises to oppress women, the lower class, and people of color. Paradigms infused with the therapeutic language of emotional healing and coping likewise flirt with the type of psychological diagnoses once ascribed to disaffected women. But as Betty Friedan's landmark 1963 The Feminist Mystique argued, the cure for female alienation was neither tranquilizers nor attitude adjustments fostered through psychotherapy but, rather, unrestricted opportunities.102

#### Fourth, failure to play Devil’s advocate undermines persuasion and there’s no offense because it doesn’t cause role confusion

**LUCKHARDT and BECHTEL 1994** (C. Grant and William, How to do Things with Logic, p 179)

This diagram indicates that first the arguers present their argument(s) for the conclusion in which they believe, here represented as A. Then the arguers formulate the best argument(s) possible for the exact opposite conclusion. If they argue in the first demonstration that, say, the best diagnosis for a patient is cholera, then as a second argumentative step the arguers will present the case for the best diagnosis not being cholera. As a third step, this strategy requires that the arguers then critique this second demonstration as well as possible. If that critique is successful, then the original demonstration stands, and the conclusion that follows is the original one, A. Why, you might wonder, would anyone ever want to engage in what may appear to be logical gymnastics? The answer is that this strategy is useful in two ways. As a method for discovering the truth of a matter, it is often **extremely helpful** in warding off the intellectual malady called “**tunnel vision**.” This is the tendency we all have to stick to our first view of a matter, failing to recognize contrary evidence as it comes in, and thus failing to revise our view to be consistent with it. In extreme cases of tunnel vision contrary evidence to one’s original view may even be noticed but be **treated as *confirming* the original view**. Requiring medical students who believe the patient has cholera to present the best case against this diagnosis will often cause them to rethink the case they had originally made. The conclusion in the end may still be the same as the original diagnosis—cholera—but now it will be a conclusion that has taken other options seriously. The devil’s advocate strategy has much to recommend in terms of its persuasiveness. Having demonstrated to your audience that you are aware of a case to be made against A, but that that case must fail, you will be perceived as having been extremely open-minded in your considerations. And you *will* have been open-minded, provided that you do not hedge in your demonstration of –A. You are not being a true devil’s advocate if your demonstration of –A is so weak that it is easily criticized in the third step. It is very tempting to hedge your demonstration of –A in this way, but also dangerous, for it invites your audience to point out that there is a better case against A than the one you have presented.

#### Fifth, this solves the case --- roleplaying is key to learn the elite’s vocabulary

**SCHAAP 2005** (Andrew, University of Melbourne, Politics, Vol 25 Iss 1, February)

Learning political theory is largely about acquiring a vocabulary that enables one to reflect more critically and precisely about the terms on which human beings (do and should) co-operate for and compete over public goods, symbolic and material. As such, political theory is necessarily abstract and general. But, competency in political theory requires an ability to move from the general to the particular and back again, not simply by applying general principles to particular events and experiences but by reflecting on and rearticulating concepts in the light of the particular. Role play is an effective technique for teaching political theory because it requires that students employ political concepts in a particular context so that learning takes place as students try out new vocabularies together with their peers and a lifelong learner in the subject: their teacher.

#### Sixth, external offense --- academic debate over energy policy in the face of environmental destruction is critical to shape the direction of change and create a public consciousness shift

Crist 4 (Eileen, Professor at Virginia Tech in the Department of Science and Technology, “Against the social construction of nature and wilderness”, Environmental Ethics 26;1, p 13-6, http://www.sts.vt.edu/faculty/crist/againstsocialconstruction.pdf)

Yet, constructivist analyses of "nature" favor remaining in the comfort zone of zestless agnosticism and noncommittal meta-discourse. As David Kidner suggests, this intellectual stance may function as a mechanism against facing the devastation of the biosphere—an undertaking long underway but gathering momentum with the imminent bottlenecking of a triumphant global consumerism and unprecedented population levels. Human-driven extinction—in the ballpark of Wilson's estimated 27,000 species per year—is so unthinkable a fact that choosing to ignore it may well be the psychologically risk-free option.

Nevertheless, this is the opportune historical moment for intellectuals in the humanities and social sciences to join forces with conservation scientists in order to help create the consciousness shift and policy changes to stop this irreversible destruction. Given this outlook, how students in the human sciences are trained to regard scientific knowledge, and what kind of messages percolate to the public from the academy about the nature of scientific findings, matter immensely. The "agnostic stance" of constructivism toward "scientific claims" about the environment—a stance supposedly mandatory for discerning how scientific knowledge is "socially assembled"[32]—is, to borrow a legendary one-liner, striving to interpret the world at an hour that is pressingly calling us to change it.

#### And --- this interpretation allows for community centered legal education --- creates a Platform for awareness that helps social justice

Hair 01

(Penda D Louder than Words:Lawyers, Communities and the Struggle for Justice, <http://www.racialequitytools.org/resourcefiles/hair.pdf>, Penda D. Hair is Co-Director of the Advancement Project at the Rockafeller Foundation, The many lawyers, clients, community organizations and activists whose visionary work in the field is reflected herein generously shared their time, experiences, lessons and mistakes, as well as triumphs. This is their report. I have tried to be an accurate and thoughtful recorder. Dayna L. Cunningham, Associate Director of the Rockefeller Foundation’s Working Communities Division, conceived this project and brought together the people and the resources to bring it to fruition. Her penetrating ideas on race and lawyering infuse every page of the Report. As important, her strong belief in the project and her incredible determination inspired the author and the advisers, and pushed this work to completion. Susan P. Sturm, Professor of Law, Columbia Law School, and Lani Guinier, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, were participants from the inception, helping to frame the project, identify case studies and put together the larger group of advisers. Angela Glover Blackwell, then Vice President of the Rockefeller Foundation (now President of PolicyLink, a national organization working to identify, support and promote local policy innovation), played a critical role in initiating and supporting this project and provided many valuable insights. Fifteen advisers guided the development of this report. Coming from national civil rights organizations, local public-interest law centers, universities and foundations, all of the advisers in their separate capacities have been deeply involved in the struggle for justice for many years. Their commitment to this project has been unwavering. )

THE CONTINUING IMPORTANCE OF STRATEGIC LITIGATION Even with judicial cutbacks in legal protections for minorities and the poor, litigation—particularly when carried out in connection with a broader social movement—can effectively build communities’ capacity to confront inequitable power structures. Community-linked litigation can function as “both symbolic and actual political activity: first, it can provide actual educational, participatory experiences for poor groups; second, it is the vehicle through which a community coheres and mobilizes.” 1 Litigation can frame issues powerfully, influence public perceptions and, ultimately, restructure unfair institutions. The courtroom can be an important space for making public the often-hidden stories of marginalized people and for connecting those stories to disputed policies. A well-placed tactical intervention, be it a successful restraining order or discovery motion, can defend a movement against attack, keep it from closing down or remove obstacles that undercut its effectiveness. In the Los Angeles MTA and the El Monte garment-worker struggles, the litigation process provided a platform for activism that helped marginalized people mobilize themselves. They developed a better understanding of the forces shaping their circumstances, of the heightened efficacy of group action, and of the ways that pressure can force local government and institutions to be more responsive. In each of these cases, through their participation, marginalized people actively shaped both the local government decision-making process and the outcomes that had fundamental impact on their lives. MAKING USE OF THE ENTIRE ARRAY OF LEGAL TOOLS In a 1992 report for the Rockefeller Foundation titled “Sustaining the Struggle for Justice,” Professor Charles Lawrence concluded that minorities and the poor ought to have access to 1 See, Lois H. Johnson, “The New Public Interest Law: From Old Theories to a New Agenda,” 1 Public Interest Law Journal, at 169, 185 (1991). 142

### 2

#### The focus on ­­­­­­­­­­­­­­native dispossession and civil society as the underpinning of all exploitations becomes an alibi for acquiescence of class struggles – they obscure the logic of capital and ensure repetition of oppression

**Zavarzadeh 94** (Mas'Ud, The Stupidity That Consumption Is Just as Productive as Production": In the Shopping Mall of the Post-al Left," College Literature, Vol. 21, No. 3, The Politics of Teaching Literature 2 (Oct., 1994),pp. 92-114)

Post-al logic is marked above all by its erasure of "production" as the determining force in organizing human societies and their institutions, and its insistence on "consumption" and "distribution" as the driving force of the social.5 The argument of the post-al left (briefly) is that "labor," in advanced industrial "democracies," is superseded by "information," and consequently "knowledge" (not class struggle over the rate of surplus labor) has become the driving force of history. The task of the post-al left is to deconstruct the "metaphysics of labor" and consequently to announce the end of socialism and with it the "outdatedness" of the praxis of abolishing private property (that is, congealed alienated labor) in the post-al moment. Instead of abolishing private property, an enlightened radical democracy which is to supplant socialism (as Laclau, Mouffe, Aronowitz, Butler, and others have advised) should make property holders of each citizen. The post-al left rejects the global objective conditions of production for the local subjective circumstances of consumption, and its master trope is what R-4 [France] so clearly foregrounds: the (shopping) "mall"?the ultimate site of consumption "with all latest high-tech textwares" deployed to pleasure the "body." In fact, the post-al left has "invented" a whole new interdiscipline called "cultural studies" that provides the new alibi for the regime of profit by shifting social analytics from "production" to "consumption." (On the political economy of "invention" in ludic theory, see Transformation 2 on "The Invention of the Queer.") To prove its "progressiveness," the post-al left devotes most of its energies (see the writings of John Fiske, Constance Penley, Michael Berube, Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Andrew Ross, Susan Willis, Stuart Hall, Fredric Jameson), to demonstrate how "consumption" is in fact an act of production and resistance to capitalism and a practice in which a Utopian vision for a society of equality is performed! The shift from "production" to "consumption" manifests itself in post-al left theories through the focus on "superstructural" cultural analysis and the preoccupation not with the "political economy" ("base") but with "representation"? for instance, of race, sexuality, environment, ethnicity, nationality, and identity. This is, for example, one reason for [Hill's] ridiculing the "base" and "superstructure" analytical model of classical Marxism (Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy) with an anecdote (the privileged mode of "argument" for the post-al left) that the base is really not all that "basic." To adhere to the base/superstructure model for [him] is to be thrown into an "epistemological gulag." For the post-al left a good society is, therefore, one in which, as [France] puts it, class antagonism is bracketed and the "surplus value" is distributed more evenly among men and women, whites and persons of color, the lesbian and the straight. It is not a society in which "surplus value"?the exploitative appropriation of the other's labor-is itself eliminated by revolutionary praxis. The post-al left's good society is not one in which private ownership is obsolete and the social division of labor (class) is abolished. Rather it is a society in which the fruit of exploitation of the proletariat (surplus labor) is more evenly distributed and a near-equality of consumption is established. This distributionist/consumptionist theory that underwrites the economic interests of the (upper)middle classes is the foundation for all the texts in this exchange and their pedagogies. A good pedagogy in these texts therefore is one in which power is distributed evenly in the classroom: a pedagogy that constructs a classroom of consensus not antagonism (thus opposition to "politicizing the classroom" in OR-1 [Hogan]) and in which knowledge (concept) is turned through the process that OR-3 [McCormick] calls "translation"?into "consumable" EXPERIENCES. The more "intense" the experience, as the anecdotes of [McCormick] show, the more successful the pedagogy. In short, it is a pedagogy that removes the student from his/her position in the social relations of production and places her/him in the personal relation of consumption: specifically, EXPERIENCE of/as the consumption of pleasure. The post-al logic **obscures** the laws of motion of capital by very specific assumptions and moves-many of which are rehearsed in the texts here. I will discuss some of these, mention others in passing, and hint at several more. (I have provided a full account of all these moves in my "Post-ality" in Transformation 1.) I begin by outlining the post-al assumptions that "democracy" is a never-ending, open "dialogue" and "conversation" among multicultural citizens; that the source of social inequities is "power"; that a post-class hegemonic "coalition," as OR-5 [Williams] calls it-and not class struggle-is the dynamics of social change; that truth (as R-l [Hill] writes) is an "epistemological gulag"? a construct of power and thus any form of "ideology critique" that raises questions of "falsehood" and "truth" ("false consciousness") does so through a violent exclusion of the "other" truths by, in [Williams'] words, "staking sole legitimate claim" to the truth in question. Given the injunction of the post-al logic against binaries (truth/falsehood), the project of "epistemology" is displaced in the ludic academy by "rhetoric." The question, consequently, becomes not so much what is the "truth" of a practice but whether it "works." (Rhetoric has always served as an alibi for pragmatism.) Therefore, [France] is not interested in whether my practices are truthful but in what effects they might have: if College Literature publishes my texts would such an act (regardless of the "truth" of my texts) end up "cutting our funding?" [he] asks. A post-al leftist like [France], in short, "resists" the state only in so far as the state does not cut [his] "funding." Similarly, it is enough for a cynical pragmatist like [Williams] to conclude that my argument "has little prospect of effectual force" in order to disregard its truthfulness. The post-al dismantling of "epistemology" and the erasure of the question of "truth," it must be pointed out, is undertaken to protect the economic interests of the ruling class. If the "truth question" is made to seem outdated and an example of an orthodox binarism ([Hill]), any conclusions about the truth of ruling class practices are excluded from the scene of social contestation as a violent logocentric (positivistic) totalization that disregards the "difference" of the ruling class. This is why a defender of the ruling class such as [Hill] sees an ideology critique aimed at unveiling false consciousness and the production of class consciousness as a form of "epistemological spanking." It is this structure of assumptions that enables [France] to answer my question, "What is wrong with being dogmatic?" not in terms of its truth but by reference to its pragmatics (rhetoric): what is "wrong" with dogmatism, [he] says, is that it is violent rhetoric ("textual Chernobyl") and thus Stalinist. If I ask what is wrong with Stalinism, again (in terms of the logic of [his] text) I will not get a political or philosophical argument but a tropological description.6 The post-al left is a New Age Left: the "new new left" privileged by [Hill] and [Williams]- the laid-back, "sensitive," listening, and dialogic left of coalitions, voluntary work, and neighborhood activism (more on these later). It is, as I will show, anti-intellectual and populist; its theory is "bite size" (mystifying, of course, who determines the "size" of the "bite"), and its model of social change is anti-conceptual "spontaneity": May 68, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and, in [Hill's] text, Chiapas. In the classroom, the New Age post-al pedagogy inhibits any critique of the truth of students' statements and instead offers, as [McCormick] makes clear, a "counseling," through anecdotes, concerning feelings. The rejection of "truth" (as "epistemological gulag"?[Hill]), is accompanied by the rejection of what the post-al left calls "economism." Furthermore, the post-al logic relativizes subjectivities, critiques functionalist explanation, opposes "determinism," and instead of closural readings, offers supplementary ones. It also celebrates eclecticism; puts great emphasis on the social as discourse and on discourse as always inexhaustible by any single interpretation? discourse (the social) always "outruns" and "exceeds" its explanation. Post-al logic is, in fact, opposed to any form of "explanation" and in favor of mimetic description: it regards "explanation" to be the intrusion of a violent outside and "description" to be a respectful, caring attention to the immanent laws of signification (inside). This notion of description which has by now become a new dogma in ludic feminist theory under the concept of "mimesis" (D. Cornell, Beyond Accommodation)?regards politics to be always immanent to practices: thus the banalities about not politicizing the classroom in [Hogan's] "anarchist" response to my text7 and the repeated opposition to binaries in all nine texts. The opposition to binaries is, in fact, an **ideological alibi for erasing class struggle**, as is quite clear in [France's] rejection of the model of a society "divided by two antagonistic classes" (see my Theory and its Other).

The construction of a particular indigenous identity category ignores the multiplicities of identity – focus on indigenous struggles alone negates anti-capitalist efforts that have existed for hundreds of years over multiple cultures – their criticism misidentifies the causes of domination and maintains a false abstraction that continues the process of capital

Herod ‘1 [James; “Indigenism”; Getting Free; Summer; http://site.www.umb.edu/faculty/salzman\_g/Strate/GetFre/21.htm //nick]

This is actually the same issue as the nationalities question and the identity question, but it might be worthwhile to treat it separately because there is an outstanding Native-American writer, Ward Churchill, who develops and advocates this theory. It is a theory, of native or indigenous peoples, which **tends to replace class analysis**, and generates a view of the history of the last five hundred years of world history which is quite at odds with an understanding of capitalism. I have never seen a critique of the idea (although surely some marxist journal has published one). It is quite erroneous to identify the enemy as Western Civilization, Europeans, or White People and to attribute the world's problems to these **false abstractions**. The rise and spread of capitalism was not only massively resisted by peoples all over the world, generating brilliant articulations of this resistance by writers and leaders like Fanon, James, Cabral, Nkrumah, Gandhi, Magon, Mandela, and Cesaire. It was also resisted by Europeans themselves. The European peasants were among the first so-called indigenous or native peoples to be dispossessed and colonized by the emerging capitalist ruling class. They were driven off their lands and forced into wage-slavery. Their villages were destroyed, and their local cultures, as were their unique languages. European resistance to capitalism was vigorous and long lasting. It gave rise to massive movements: the labor movement, the cooperative movement, communism, socialism, anarchism, syndicalism. It resulted in revolutions: the revolutions of 1848, the Paris Commune, the failed revolutions in Central Europe in 1919, the Spanish Civil War, the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, Polish Solidarity, and so forth. There was a worldwide upsurge of anti-capitalist resistance in 1968, and this took place also throughout Europe and the West. Recently there has been another such wave of global opposition to capitalism, but which has appeared also in Seattle, Quebec City, and Genoa. Thus I believe that **Indigenism mis-identifies the enemy**, and is therefore incompatible with an Association of Free Peoples (anarchism, communism). Actually, we are just now witnessing a still basically peasant population in Europe, in the Balkans, being hit with an improved, strengthened, new, enclosures movement. Are the peasants in twenty-first century Eastern Europe indigenous peoples who are being attacked by Western Civilization or are they being dispossessed by the neoliberal offensive of late capitalism? Indigenists I think will have to be double-jointed to apply their theory to recent events in Eastern Europe, because peasants there are White, European, a part of Western Civilization, and are Indigenous, if by that term we mean that they have lived there for eons (although most of them moved there from elsewhere in some distant past, as have all so-called Indigenous peoples on earth). So I guess they are attacking themselves, if we follow Indigenism. Thus, rejection of and resistance to capitalism, imperialism, and colonialism has been going on in Europe too, not just in the world outside Europe. It distorts the picture to deny this. Marx himself wrote some of the earliest analyses of colonialism in his essays on India and Ireland. Western Civilization thus includes not only capitalism, but also the critique of capitalism. If we use the term at all it should include both these movements, the evil of capitalism and the good of anti-capitalism. It includes not only White Europeans who fought to impose capitalism on the world, but White Europeans who fought to stop this and to get free from capitalism completely. The terms European and White are false abstractions, in that it is only some Europeans and only some Whites that have colonized the world. Just as it was wrong for some radical feminists to see all men as the enemy, or for some black nationalists to see all whites as the enemy, so also it is wrong for Native Americans to see all non-indigenous people as the enemy, and for Indigenists to blame all Europeans and all Whites for imperialism. Thus I can no longer accept the notion of indigenous versus nonindigenous people. I much prefer to think in terms of oppressors and the oppressed, exploiters and the exploited, criminals and victims, rulers and the ruled, rather than in terms of western civilization versus the rest of the world, and certainly rather than Whites versus People of Color. Ireland, one of the first countries to be colonized, was a nation of white people. In Africa, the ruling classes are Africans, in the Middle East they are Arabs, Turks, Persians, or Jews, in Asia they are Asians. Local ruling classes, generally speaking, are of the race and ethnicity of their nations, and yet are intimately tied into the world capitalist system, vigorously defend it, and use it to exploit their peoples, for their own enrichment. Japanese exploit Japanese in Japan, Chinese exploit Chinese in China, Indians exploit Indians in India, Haitians exploit Haitians in Haiti. So how can it be claimed that oppressors are all European and White? It has even become fashionable now to criticize anyone who talks of Capitalism as having originated in Europe and spread from there throughout the world as Eurocentric. Why anyone would want to take credit for an evil social order like capitalism is a mystery to me. But as has been recently argued brilliantly by Ellen Meiksins Wood, their anti-Eurocentrism is itself Eurocentric, in that it embraces a liberal European theory about the origins of capitalism, as having evolved naturally from trade and commerce (basically, the Pirenne thesis), which evolution would have happened elsewhere had it not been blocked by Europeans, rather than adopt the radical analysis which claims that capitalism originated in an unusual set of historical circumstances and is not a natural development at all, but an aberration. This widespread anti-Eurocentrism is on a par with the growing influence of Indigenism, and is just as misguided. I argue, however, that in point of fact, seen historically, there is no such thing as an indigenous people. Every people on earth originally came from somewhere else. Even Africans who are now living in the very same area where our species first appeared came from somewhere else, because those original homo sapiens are long gone, having migrated to the far corners of the earth. Those living there now moved in from elsewhere. Reports are, that of the Indians now living in Chiapas, Mexico, a lot of them moved there recently from Guatemala. All the so-called native peoples of the Americas of course originally came from somewhere else, either from Siberia (the traditional theory) or from across the seas (Cyrus Gordon). I've never heard anyone claim that homo sapiens evolved independently in the Americas. There have been mass migrations throughout human history -- Huns moving into eastern Europe, Turks from Central Asia moving into the fertile crescent and Asia Minor, Aztecs conquering the Mayans, Vikings settling in Ireland, Normans invading England, Russians migrating into Siberia, Greeks into Asia Minor, Franks and Celts filtering south into the Roman Empire, Arabs into Spain, Chinese into Indonesia, Jews into Palestine, Africans into the Americas, Indians into South Africa, and on and on. The human race is one incredibly jumbled up affair. A people has always called itself something, always has had a name for itself, which is one thing we mean by ethnicity. But the more general concept of indigenous people is of more recent origin. In fact I believe it is of very recent origin, dating from the sixties. I think it is part of the Identity Politics that emerged out of the New Left in the United States. The New Left, in its determined blindness to the working class, invented a whole set of new categories, and built movements on them -- women, gays and lesbians, blacks, old people, welfare mothers, youth, Latinos -- and, of course, Native Americans. There was a movement here, AIM, the American Indian Movement, of which Leonard Peltier was a member. Native Americans became one of the many categories (replacing that of class) that made up Identity Politics. Fortunately, we are currently witnessing, after nearly thirty dreary years, the demise of this orientation. Not to say that there weren't positive things accomplished by this focus, but it couldn't, and didn't, overthrow capitalism. Obviously, the idea of an indigenous people sets up a contrast with non-indigenous peoples. And in our present historical situation we all know who that refers to -- Europeans. We certainly never see it used with regard to the Japanese colonizing Southeast Asia, or the Chinese colonizing Tibet. No, it is a current, but badly misguided, attempt to conceptualize the expansion of capitalism to all corners of the earth. This is actually a mis-conceptualization, because it blames all Europeans for something that only a few of them have done. It sets up a conflict between Europeans and the rest of humanity, ignoring the fact that European peasants were among the first to be colonized, dispossessed, uprooted, and sent packing, as well as ignorning the fact that local ruling classes have helped affix the ball and chain of capitalism to every nook and cranny of the earth. We must remember that the great migrations of people out of Europe that have taken place under capitalism were not all composed of imperialists and colonizers. Many of those leaving were such, of course, but they were very far from being in the majority. Australia was founded as a prison colony. The ruling class of England expelled its criminals and undesirables from England and deposited them in Australia. Millions came to the United States as indentured servants. Tens of millions more came as the result of the enclosures movement in Europe. They had been forced off their lands and had to go elsewhere to live. Blacks of course were brought here as slaves (and it's interesting that Blacks are never considered, by Indigenists, as non-indigenous people, no matter where they live; this is a slur that is reserved for European whites). The great wave of Irish immigration to this country was caused by the colonization of Ireland by the English, who seized the farms there and used them for export crops, thus starving millions of Irish peasants, who had to leave -- a process that is going on now again all over the world on a vast scale. Millions of eastern European Jews came to this country to escape the pogroms, in 1905 especially, but also at other times. The vast migrations to Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay were for similar reasons. When we start thinking in terms of indigenous vs non-indigenous, native vs european, people of color vs whites, we get into such a briar patch of contradictions it becomes simply laughable. Are the whites in South Africa, who have been there for four hundred years, to pack up and go back to Europe, because they are not indigenous? (Same with Algeria, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the United States.) Are the nations of Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay, which are predominantly of European extract and white, to be defined as People of Color and Third World? Are the Irish, one of the first people colonized, included in the oppressed indigenous peoples, or are they white Europeans and part of the oppressors? Are the Turks, many of whom look just like Europeans, with red hair and all, being of Indo-European stock mixed up with Mongolian stock, people of color or white? Are they part of Asia or Europe? Are they third world or first world? They nearly conquered Vienna once, after all, and have lived in the Balkans for half a millennium. Should the Puerto Ricans in New York, Turks in Berlin, Algerians in Paris, Chinese in San Francisco, or West Indians in London all go back where they came from? Are the Chinese communities in Indonesia indigenous or not? Are the Indian communities in South Africa indigenous or not? Are the Arabs in the southern Sahara to go back to Arabia where they came from? How long does a people have to live in an area before it becomes indigenous? Do the Jews (the Zionists among them), who want to go 'home' to Palestine, have a real claim to that territory even though they have been gone for 2000 years and Arabs have been living there all that time? Can they now go back and drive the Arabs out, claiming that Palestine is theirs? How anyone can think that this quagmire is superior to class analysis is beyond me. A critic of my take on indigenism said that I had missed the point. Indigenous is just a name for the people who were in a place before the Europeans arrived, he claimed. Perhaps the concept has a certain plausibly when applied to the United States and Canada, and one or two other places, but it rapidly breaks down if applied worldwide (and it is even false, as explained above, when used for the US and Canada). Yet Indigenism is being applied worldwide, and has practically become a movement, and is spreading, as an analysis, and becoming a widely accepted approach to the strategy and philosophy of revolution. Naturally, if there are important grass roots movements of people who call themselves indigenous you might argue that it makes sense to call them what they themselves call themselves, and for the most part I would agree. Of course, a movement, group, or people can call themselves anything they want to. It is their right to do so. And out of respect for them, there is generally no reason why others shouldn't accept the name. That doesn't mean we have to suspend critical judgement though, especially if a name has theoretical significance. I had no problem, for example, switching from Negro to African-American, because in that case, it was pretty much immaterial to me what name was preferred. (I refuse to use the term People of Color however, which I regard as pompous, euphemistic, and pretentious, seeing no difference between it and Colored People, which is taboo; the condoned phrase is actually closely linked with Indigenism). The term indigenous however is in a rather different category. It has become a name for a whole analysis, an analysis which is unaware of or denies that we live in a capitalist social order. So I'm wary of it, and ultimately opposed to it. None of this means however that I don't support the revolts of people who call themselves indigenous, like the Zapatista revolt in Chiapas, which is obviously a very significant struggle. All kinds of struggles are undertaken by people who don't have the analysis that I wish they had -- strikes, boycotts, urban insurrections, demonstrations -- all done by people who don't have a thought of overthrowing capitalism -- but I'm happy to see those revolts. It will all add up in the end, or at least I hope so. The Zapatistas have been especially creative in breaking down all sorts of barriers, mind sets, categories, and boundaries. Who knows where it will all end? It's hard to imagine that it won't end in something good. But I still take a critical attitude toward their conceptual framework and self-identity. I recently asked a friend who is living in Mexico about the racial breakdown in Mexico, and whether or not there was a name for a pure blooded Spaniard, and how conscious people were of racial distinctions there. He sent me back some passages from a book by James Cockcroft, Mexico's Hope, which described the following distinctions (this was from considerably earlier in Mexican history): "Spaniards were at the top of the social pyramid, followed by successful criollos (whites born in Mexico), mestizos (of mixed Spanish/Indian descent), mulattos (of mixed black and white descent), negros (Africans), and, at the bottom, Indians." (There are obviously a couple of likely categories missing: persons of mixed black and indian descent, and persons of mixed white, black, and indian decent.) So the question is: how can a mix like this ever be divided into indigenous and non-indigenous, and even if it could be, how could a just social policy ever be based on such a distinction? In Cuba, the people who lived on the island before Columbus have long since been exterminated. None of the people there now are indigenous (in the sense of being there before Columbus). The population of Cuba now is composed of ex-slaves (blacks, negroes), ex-slave owners and other Spaniards (whites, criollos), and mulattos. Indigenists though do not consider the population of Cuba to be non-indigenous (a bad term), but third world and people of color (good terms). So their application of the concept is rather contradictory and hypocritical. The Turks started migrating into Asia Minor around the eleventh century. They captured Constantinople in 1453. So I guess you couldn't consider them indigenous to Anatolia, having come originally from Central Asia, although by now they have been living there for nine hundred years. North Africa, originally a land of the Berbers, was overrun first by Arabs, and then by Ottoman Turks, and finally by the French, as empires waxed and waned. The Berbers, Arabs, Turks, and French are all still there. In Lebanon, the population is divided religiously into Marionite Christians, Druses, and Muslims, all ethnic Arabs, plus hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees, from just across the border. Are the Palestinian refugees non-indigenous? They are Arabs, but not Lebanese. Each of the main religious groups considers the others as somewhat illegitimate, although not exactly alien or foreign I guess. At one time or another, since ancient times, just about every ethnic group in the Middle East, and there are many, has passed through Lebanon, with some of them staying behind to settle. It would be next to impossible to say who is indigenous to that region. In Egypt, in the Nile delta, peasants have been there for eons. I guess you could call them indigenous. Of course, European Spaniards are themselves mestizos in a sense, being a mixture of Arab and European genes (and Arabs are a mixture of Indo-European, Mongolian, and African genes). In this case, since the Arabs were the invading group, representing a so-called higher civilization, and were imposing their culture on so-called native, indigenous Europeans, the Spaniards were the colonized, while the Arabs were the colonizers. So many contemporary Spaniards are mestizos, the descendants of a colonized people, who intermarried with their colonizers. The same might be said of the Turkish invasion of Eastern Europe and the Balkans. The Turks were the invaders. So the Europeans, according to indigenous theory, would have to be considered the native, indigenous, colonized element. There was also an earlier invasion of Eastern Europe by the Huns from Central Asia (c.379), and a later invasion by Mongolians (c.1279). Also, many southern Europeans have some African genes, from way back, and are therefore mulattos. Dark complexioned persons are born throughout Europe in fact, except in the far north. Marx was called The Moor because of his dark complexion. So, many eastern and southern Europeans have long been either mestizos or mulattos. All of which shows why I believe it is rather absurd to try to comprehend history in terms of blood lines. Many radical Latinos who are part European genetically, nevertheless adopt the identity of an indigenous person. How is it that they identify only with their Indian genes, but not with their European genes? Isn't it somewhat dishonest not to acknowledge one's actual genetic heritage, but instead only recognize those genes that are ideologically fashionable? I got into a dispute once with a man who walked into the Lucy Parsons Center, a radical bookstore in Boston, and started trashing a young woman who was staffing the store, because she was white, and therefore imperialist, and "part of the problem". This man himself was white. He looked European to me. I could see no visible evidence of black or indian genes. It turned out though that he was Puerto Rican, and considered himself to be a Person of Color. It's possible of course that he was Mestizo or Mulatto, and might have fathered black or brown children. But it's also possible that he was a pure blooded descendant of Spaniards, and of pure European ancestry, genetically speaking. Yet he denied the European part of his genetic heritage. There was another similar incident at the store one day. A young woman came in who claimed that she was an Indian. She was tall and slender, had blue eyes, blond hair, and ivory white skin. I looked at her in astonishment. "How do you figure that?" I asked her. She claimed that her great-great grandmother was an Indian. So we see how far at least one sensitive young person would go to avoid the stigma of being White and European, a stigma that has been aided and abetted by Indigenism. A big part of the problem with the concept of indigenous people is that it is linked to territory in a very bad way. Can the remaining American Indians in the United States ever really be free by trying to reclaim the land they once lived on? Can they link their destiny to the reservations they still own (by treaty with the government in Washington, DC)? Or is another approach called for, in which all peoples can be free, regardless of their ethnicity or where they live, and where nothing, including land, is commodified and bought and sold? Edward Said published an insightful piece recently in the Progressive (December 1999), about territory, although I don't think he got it quite right. He had returned to a village in Palestine, where a horrible massacre of Palestinians had taken place in 1948, and was struck by the irreconcilable interpretations of the place offered by himself and his Israeli guide. He writes: "This incident raises a profound existential dilemma, and not just for Palestinians: how to deal with issues of contested territory and competing claims of ethno-national identity? "It seems clear to me that schemes of separation and partition and wishful ideas of creating ethnic or religious homogeneity have failed miserably and, in fact, have reproduced and intensified the problems they were designed to remedy. The idea was to divide Ireland between Protestants and Catholics. It hasn't worked. The idea to divide Cyprus between Turks and Greeks hasn't worked, either. The partition of Palestine between Jews and Arabs hasn't worked. Israel is not a homogeneous Jewish state. Twenty percent of the population are non-Jews. What do you do about them? The whole idea of partitioning and trying to separate ethnic groups who have lived together in one way or another, in contest or not, into pure states is a mistake. Look at India, which is largely a Hindu state but has a Muslim population of 120 to 150 million people. What do you do about them?" Later on he describes, rightly, the destruction that Identity Politics has caused in the Middle East over most of the decades of his life. And then he comments: "Identity, I think, is more of a burden and an inhibitor of thought -- especially identity as ethnic, religious, or even national particularity. This identity strikes me as something to be gotten over." Unfortunately though, in seeking a solution to "the ravages of the politics of identity", he moves in the direction of a universal, secular humanism, rather than toward a decentered, diverse, anarchistic world. If he had given more consideration to the two-hundred-year-old communist and anarchist attack on states as such, he might have seen another solution.

**The aff’s approach to knowledge which privileges subjectivity and uncertainty denies the objectivity in class relations and the oppression that is produced from capital accumulation**

**Zavarzadeh 94** (Mas'Ud, The Stupidity That Consumption Is Just as Productive as Production": In the Shopping Mall of the Post-al Left," College Literature, Vol. 21, No. 3, The Politics of Teaching Literature 2 (Oct., 1994), pp. 92-114)

**The unsurpassable objectivity** which is **not open** to rhetorical **interpretation** and constitutes the decided foundation of critique is the "outside" that Marx calls the "Working Day" (Capital 1: 340-416). ([France] willfully misrecognizes my notion of objectivity by confusing my discussion of identity politics and objectivity.) The working day is not what it seems: its reality, like the reality of all capitalist practices, is an alienated reality-there is a contradiction between its appearance and its essence. It "appears" as if the worker, during the working day, receives wages that are equal compensation for his labor. This mystification originates in the fact that the capitalist pays not for "labor" but for "labor power": when labor power is put to use it produces more than it is paid for. The "working day" is the site of the unfolding of this fundamental contradiction: it is a divided day, divided into "necessary labor" the part in which the worker produces value equivalent to his wages and the "other," the part of "surplus labor"?a part in which the worker works for free and produces "surplus value." The second part of the working day is the source of profit and accumulation of capital. "Surplus labor" is the OBJECTIVE FACT of capitalist relations of production: without "surplus labor" there will be no profit, and without profit there will be no accumulation of capital, and without accumulation of capital there will be no capitalism. The goal of bourgeois economics is to conceal this part of the working day, and it should therefore be no surprise that, as a protector of ruling class interests in the academy, [Hill], with a studied casualness, places "surplus value" in the adjacency of "radical bible-studies" and quietly turns it into a rather boring matter of interest perhaps only to the dogmatic. To be more concise: "surplus labor" is that **objective, unsurpassable "outside**" that cannot be made part of the economies of the "inside" without capitalism itself being transformed into socialism. Revolutionary critique is grounded in this truth-objectivity-since all social institutions and practices of capitalism are founded upon the objectivity of surplus labor. The role of a revolutionary pedagogy of critique is to produce class consciousness so as to assist in organizing people into a new vanguard party that aims at abolishing this FACT of the capitalist system and trans-forming capitalism into a communist society. As I have argued in my "Postality" [Transformation 1], (post)structuralist theory, through the concept of "representation," makes all such facts an effect of interpretation and turns them into "undecidable" processes. The boom in ludic theory and Rhetoric Studies in the bourgeois academy is caused by the service it renders the ruling class: it makes the OBJECTIVE reality of the extraction of surplus labor a subjective one-not a decided fact but a matter of "interpretation." In doing so, it "deconstructs" (see the writings of such bourgeois readers as Gayatri Spivak, Cornel West, and Donna Haraway) the labor theory of value, displaces production with consumption, and resituates the citizen from the revolutionary cell to the ludic shopping mall of [France].

#### Vote negative to endorse a political strategy that withdraws from capitalist relations

#### Universal Rejection is key – it’s the only way to hollow out capitalist structures – the debate should be a question of competing methodologies – The primary question of the ballot should be affirming an ethical orientation that best organizes against capitalist relations

Herod 4 renowned philosopher, author, and social activist

(James, “Getting Free”, <http://site.www.umb.edu/faculty/salzman_g/Strate/GetFre/06.htm>, accessed 8/6/09)

It is time to try to describe, at first abstractly and later concretely, a strategy for destroying capitalism. This strategy, at its most basic, calls for pulling time, energy, and resources out of capitalist civilization and putting them into building a new civilization. The image then is one of emptying out capitalist structures, hollowing them out, by draining wealth, power, and meaning out of them until there is nothing left but shells**.** This is definitely an aggressive strategy. It requires great militancy, and constitutes an attack on the existing order.The strategy clearly recognizes that capitalism is the enemy and must be destroyed, but it is not a frontal attack aimed at overthrowing the system, but an inside attack aimed at gutting it, while simultaneously replacing it with something better, something we want. Thus capitalist structures (corporations, governments, banks, schools, etc.) are not seized so much as simply abandoned. Capitalist relations are not fought so much as they are simply rejected. We stop participating in activities that support (finance, condone) the capitalist world and start participating in activities that build a new world while simultaneously undermining the old. We create a new pattern of social relations alongside capitalist relations and then we continually build and strengthen our new pattern while doing every thing we can to weaken capitalist relations. In this way our new democratic, non-hierarchical, non-commodified relations can eventually overwhelm the capitalist relations and force them out of existence**.** This is how it has to be done. This is a plausible, realistic strategy**.** To think that we could create a whole new world of decent social arrangements overnight, in the midst of a crisis, during a so-called revolution, or during the collapse of capitalism, is foolhardy**.** Our new social world must grow within the old, and in opposition to it, until it is strong enough to dismantle and abolish capitalist relations. Such a revolution will never happen automatically, blindly, determinably, because of the inexorable, materialist laws of history. It will happen, and only happen, because we want it to, and because we know what we’re doing and know how we want to live, and know what obstacles have to be overcome before we can live that way, and know how to distinguish between our social patterns and theirs. But we must not think that the capitalist world can simply be ignored, in a live and let live attitude, while we try to build new lives elsewhere. (There is no elsewhere.) There is at least one thing, wage-slavery, that we can’t imply stop participating in (but even here there are ways we can chip away at it). Capitalism must be explicitly refused and replaced by something else. This constitutes War, but it is not a war in the traditional sense of armies and tanks, but a war fought on a daily basis, on the level of everyday life, by millions of people. It is a war nevertheless because the accumulators of capital will use coercion, brutality, and murder, as they have always done in the past, to try to block any rejection of the system. They have always had to force compliance; they will not hesitate to continue doing so. Nevertheless, there are many concrete ways that individuals, groups, and neighborhoods can gut capitalism, which I will enumerate shortly. We must always keep in mind how we became slaves; then we can see more clearly how we can cease being slaves**.** We were forced into wage-slavery because the ruling class slowly, systematically, and brutally destroyed our ability to live autonomously. By driving us off the land, changing the property laws, destroying community rights, destroying our tools, imposing taxes, destroying our local markets**,** and so forth, we were forced onto the labor market in order to survive, our only remaining option being to sell, for a wage, our ability to work. It’s quite clear then how we can overthrow slavery. We must reverse this process. We must begin to reacquire the ability to live without working for a wage or buying the products made by wage-slaves (that is, we must get free from the labor market and the way of living based on it), and embed ourselves instead in cooperative labor and cooperatively produced goods. Another clarification is needed. This strategy does not call for reforming capitalism, for changing capitalism into something else. It calls for replacing capitalism, totally, with a new civilization. This is an important distinction, because capitalism has proved impervious to reforms, as a system. We can sometimes in some places win certain concessions from it (usually only temporary ones) and win some (usually short-lived) improvements in our lives as its victims, but we cannot reform it piecemeal, as a system. Thus our strategy of gutting and eventually destroying capitalism requires at a minimum a totalizing image, an awareness that we are attacking an entire way of life and replacing it with another, and not merely reforming one way of life into something else. Many people may not be accustomed to thinking about entire systems and social orders, but everyone knows what a lifestyle is, or a way of life, and that is the way we should approach it. The thing is this: in order for capitalism to be destroyed millions and millions of people must be dissatisfied with their way of life. They must want something else and see certain existing things as obstacles to getting what they want**.** It is not useful to think of this as a new ideology. It is not merely a belief-system that is needed, like a religion, or like Marxism, or Anarchism. Rather it is a new prevailing vision, a dominant desire, an overriding need. What must exist is a pressing desire to live a certain way, and not to live another way. If this pressing desire were a desire to live free, to be autonomous, to live in democratically controlled communities, to participate in the self-regulating activities of a mature people, then capitalism could be destroyed. Otherwise we are doomed to perpetual slavery and possibly even to extinction. The content of this vision is actually not new at all, but quite old. The long term goa**l** of communists, anarchists, and socialists has always been to restore community. Even the great peasant revolts of early capitalism sought to get free from external authorities and restore autonomy to villages. Marx defined communism once as a free association of producers, and at another time as a situation in which the free development of each is a condition for the free development of all**.** Anarchists have always called for worker and peasant self-managed cooperatives. The long term goals have always been clear: to abolish wage-slavery, to eradicate a social order organized solely around the accumulation of capital for its own sake, and to establish in its place a society of free people who democratically and cooperatively self-determine the shape of their social world**.**

### Case

#### Personalizing advocacy destroys pedagogy

SUBOTNIK 98 Professor of Law, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center.

7 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 681

Having traced a major strand in the development of CRT, we turn now to the strands' effect on the relationships of CRATs with each other and with outsiders. As the foregoing material suggests, **the central** CRT **message is not simply that minorities are being treated unfairly**, or even that individuals out there are in pain - assertions for which there are data to serve as grist for the academic mill - **but that the minority scholar himself or herself hurts and hurts badly**.¶ An important problem that concerns the very definition of the scholarly enterprise now comes into focus. What can an academictrained to [\*694] question and to doubt n72 possibly say **to Patricia Williams when effectively she announces, "I hurt bad"?** n73 **"No, you don't hurt"? "You shouldn't hurt"?** "Other people hurt too"? Or, most dangerously - and perhaps most tellingly - "What do you expect when you keep shooting yourself in the foot?" If the majority were perceived as having the well- being of minority groups in mind, these responses might be acceptable, even welcomed. And they might lead to real conversation. But, **writes Williams, the failure by those "cushioned within the invisible privileges of race and power**... to incorporate a sense of precarious connection as a part of our **lives is... ultimately obliterating**." n74¶ "Precarious." "Obliterating." **These words will clearly invite responses** only from fools and sociopaths; they will, by effectively precluding objection, disconcert and disunite others. **"I hurt," in academic discourse, has three broad though interrelated effects**. First, it demands priority from the reader's conscience. **It is for this reason that law review editors, waiving usual standards, have privileged a long trail of undisciplined - even silly** n75 **- destructive and, above all, self-destructive arti cles.** n76 **Second,** by emphasizing the emotional bond **between those who hurt in a similar way, "I hurt"** discourages fellow sufferers from abstracting themselves **from their pain in order to gain perspective on their condition**. n77¶ [\*696] **Last, as we have seen,** it precludes the possibility of open and structured conversation with others. n78 [\*697] **It is because of this conversation-stopping effect** of what they insensitively call "first-person agony stories" **that Farber and Sherry deplore their use.** "The norms of academic civility hamper readers from challenging the accuracy of the researcher's account; it would be rather difficult, for example, to criticize a law review article by questioning the author's emotional stability or veracity." n79 Perhaps, a better practice would be to put the scholar's experience on the table, along with other relevant material, but to subject that experience to the same level of scrutiny.¶ If **through the foregoing rhetorical strategies CRATs succeeded in limiting academic debate**, why do they not have greater influence on public policy? **Discouraging white legal scholars from entering the national conversation about race**, n80 I suggest, **has generated a kind of cynicism in white audiences** which, in turn, has had precisely the reverse effect of that ostensibly desired by CRATs. It drives the American public to the right and ensures that anything CRT offers is reflexively rejected**.**¶ In the absence of scholarly work by white males in the area of race, of course, it is difficult to be sure what reasons they would give for not having rallied behind CRT. Two things, however, are certain. First, **the kinds of issues** raised by Williams **are too important** in their implications [\*698] for American life **to be confined to communities of color.** If the lives of minorities are heavily constrained, if not fully defined, by the thoughts and actions of the majority elements in society, **it would seem to be of great importance that white thinkers and doers participate in open discourse** to bring about change. Second, given the lack of engagement of CRT by the community of legal scholars as a whole, the discourse that should be taking place at the highest scholarly levels has, by default, been displaced to faculty offices and, more generally, the streets and the airwaves.

#### Wilderson builds his ideas of libidinal economy off of Jared Sexton – it relies upon a notion of the UNCONSCIOUS

**Wilderson page 6 the book in 10** (Red, White, and Black: Cinema and the structure of U.S. Antagonisms, *)*Jared Sexton describes libidinal economy as “the economy, or distribution and arrangement, of desire and identification(their condensation and displacement), and the complex relationship between sexuality and the unconscious.” Needless to say, libidinal economy functions variously across scales and is as “objective” as political economy. It is linked not only to forms of attraction, affection, and alliance, but also to aggression, destruction , and the violence of lethal consumption. Sexton emphasizes that is is the “whole structure of psychic and emotional life,” somtheing more than, but inclusive of or traversed by, what Antonio Gramsci and other Marxists call a “structure of feeling”; it is “a dispensation of energies, concerns, points of attention, anxieties pleasures, appetites, revulsions, and phobias capable of both great mobility and tenacious fixation.”

#### Their reliance on the universal psyche eliminates any attempt at a radical break - it cannot truly know the human experience

Brickman ‘3 [Celia (Center for Religion and Psychotherapy of Chicago, PhD in Religion and the Human Sciences at the University of Chicago); Aboriginal Populations in the Mind: Race and Primitivity in Psychoanalysis; Columbia University Press; New York; p. 206-7 //nick]

When psychoanalysis supplies a phylogenetic content to the unconscious, it dictates a universal, ahistorical, and precultural stratum of the human mind, repressed or repudiated since infantile or “primitive” times, as the cost for the inauguration of an enculturated subjectivity. Although there may always be some exclusions brought into being through the inauguration of subjectivity, these exclusions would vary with culture and history, and therefore be open to some degree of alteration. 22 To assert that we already know the contents (phylogenetic or otherwise) of the unconscious in all cases and in all cultures denies the risk of the unknown that a true encounter with the other always poses to our own certainties of knowledge. In addition, the formulation of subjectivity as predicated on a repudiation of a universal, precultural primitivity reinforces the binarism of nature and culture, since it understands our entry into culture as condemning us to be forever and inescapably alienated from the “natural”—primitive——part of ourselves (and thus from those peoples identified as part of nature), setting the scene for the analyst as the authority who can inform us about the contents of this inaccessible part of ourselves. (As we have seen, it is not only the patient who falls into the trap of believing that the analyst is “the subject who is supposed to know.”)23But if the unconscious can be released from a developmental framework in which subjectivity is premised exclusively on repudiation or separation, then it need not be imagined as an abjected, inaccessible primitivity. Then the emergence of unconscious contents in the analytic encounter need not be insctibed as a regression back down the developmental scale but can be seen as the emergence of dimensions of experience whose existence has been obscured by, but is nonetheless coeval with, the preoccupations of consciousness. The encounter with the unconscious is a return to moments of the past simply insofar as it allows us to dc-sediment the identifications that have contributed to subjectivity; insofar as it allows us, as Cornelius Castoriadis has suggested, to consider subjectivity from the vantage point of its contingency, from the vantage point of how it became fixed or essentialized as that which it now is.24 The analytic relationship need not be about the imposition of authoritative knowledge nor about disabusing the analysand of the fantasy of the analyst’s authority. It can be a way of coming to know oneself, of becoming capable of feeling more fully alive, and of engaging more fully with the world through being with—rather than being dominated by, or fearing domination by—another. The interminability of analysis, rather than due to a bedrock of resistance to a primitivity that can never be overcome, would then have to do with the fact that the unconscious always exceeds our capacity to understand it: no analysis can ever exhaust it and thus truly come to an end.

#### Libidinal economy doesn’t explain violence

Carel 6

Havi Carel 6, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of the West of England, “Life and Death in Freud and Heidegger”, googlebooks

Secondly, the constancy principle on which these ideas are based is incompatible with observational data. Once the passive model of the nervous system has been discarded, there was no need for external excitation in order for discharge to take place, and more generally, "the behavioural picture seemed to negate the notion of drive, as a separate energizer of behaviour" {Hcbb. 1982. p.35). According to Holt, the nervous system is not passive; it does not take in and conduct out energy from the environment, and it shows no tendency to discharge its impulses. 'The principle of constancy is quite without any biological basis" (1965, p. 109). He goes on to present the difficulties that arise from the pleasure principle as linked to a tension-reduction theory. The notion of tension is "conveniently ambiguous": it has phenomenological, physiological and abstract meaning. But empirical evidence against the theory of tension reduction has been "mounting steadily" and any further attempts to link pleasure with a reduction of physiological tension are "decisively refuted" (1965, pp. 1102). Additionally, the organism and the mental system are no longer considered closed systems. So the main arguments for the economic view collapse, as does the entropic argument for the death drive (1965, p. 114). A final, more general criticism of Freud's economic theory is sounded by Compton, who argues, "Freud fills in psychological discontinuities with neurological hypotheses" (1981, p. 195). The Nirvana principle is part and parcel of the economic view and the incomplete and erroneous assumptions about the nervous system (Hobson, 1988, p.277). It is an extension ad extremis of the pleasure principle, and as such is vulnerable to all the above criticisms. The overall contemporary view provides strong support for discarding the Nirvana principle and reconstructing the death drive as aggression.

#### No empirical basis for scaling up psychoanalysis

Epstein, senior lecturer in government and IR – University of Sydney, ‘10

(Charlotte, “Who speaks? Discourse, the subject and the study of identity in international politics,” European Journal of International Relations XX(X) 1–24)

One key advantage of the Wendtian move, granted even by his critics (see Flockhart, 2006), is that it simply does away with the level-of-analysis problem altogether. If states really are persons, then we can apply everything we know about people to understand how they behave. The study of individual identity is not only theoretically justified but it is warranted. This cohesive self borrowed from social psychology is what allows Wendt to bridge the different levels of analysis and travel between the self of the individual and that of the state, by way of a third term, ‘group self’, which is simply an aggregate of individual selves. Thus for Wendt (1999: 225) ‘the state is simply a “group Self” capable of group level cognition’. Yet that the individual possesses a self does not logically entail that the state possesses one too. It is in this leap, from the individual to the state, that IR’s fallacy of composition surfaces most clearly. Moving beyond Wendt but maintaining the psychological self as the basis for theorizing the state Wendt’s bold ontological claim is far from having attracted unanimous support (see nota­bly, Flockhart, 2006; Jackson, 2004; Neumann, 2004; Schiff, 2008; Wight, 2004). One line of critique of the states-as-persons thesis has taken shape around the resort to psy­chological theories, specifically, around the respective merits of Identity Theory (Wendt) and SIT (Flockhart, 2006; Greenhill, 2008; Mercer, 2005) for understanding state behav­iour.9 Importantly for my argument, that the state has a self, and that this self is pre-social, remains unquestioned in this further entrenching of the psychological turn. Instead questions have revolved around how this pre-social self (Wendt’s ‘Ego’) behaves once it encounters the other (Alter): whether, at that point (and not before), it takes on roles prescribed by pre-existing cultures (whether Hobbessian, Lockean or Kantian) or whether instead other, less culturally specific, dynamics rooted in more universally human char­acteristics better explain state interactions. SIT in particular emphasizes the individual’s basic need to belong, and it highlights the dynamics of in-/out-group categorizations as a key determinant of behaviour (Billig, 2004). SIT seems to have attracted increasing interest from IR scholars, interestingly, for both critiquing (Greenhill, 2008; Mercer, 1995) and rescuing constructivism (Flockhart, 2006). For Trine Flockart (2006: 89–91), SIT can provide constructivism with a different basis for developing a theory of agency that steers clear of the states-as-persons thesis while filling an important gap in the socialization literature, which has tended to focus on norms rather than the actors adopting them. She shows that a state’s adherence to a new norm is best understood as the act of joining a group that shares a set of norms and val­ues, for example the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). What SIT draws out are the benefits that accrue to the actor from belonging to a group, namely increased self-esteem and a clear cognitive map for categorizing other states as ‘in-’ or ‘out-group’ members and, from there, for orientating states’ self–other relationships. Whilst coming at it from a stance explicitly critical of constructivism, for Jonathan Mercer (2005: 1995) the use of psychology remains key to correcting the systematic evacuation of the role of emotion and other ‘non-rational’ phenomena in rational choice and behaviourist analyses, which has significantly impaired the understanding of inter­national politics. SIT serves to draw out the emotional component of some of the key drivers of international politics, such as trust, reputation and even choice (Mercer, 2005: 90–95; see also Mercer, 1995). Brian Greenhill (2008) for his part uses SIT amongst a broader array of psychological theories to analyse the phenomenon of self–other recog­nition and, from there, to take issue with the late Wendtian assumption that mutual recognition can provide an adequate basis for the formation of a collective identity amongst states. The main problem with this psychological turn is the very utilitarian, almost mecha­nistic, approach to non-rational phenomena it proposes, which tends to evacuate the role of meaning. In other words, it further shores up the pre-social dimension of the concept of self that is at issue here. Indeed norms (Flockhart, 2006), emotions (Mercer, 2005) and recognition (Greenhill, 2008) are hardly appraised as symbolic phenomena. In fact, in the dynamics of in- versus out-group categorization emphasized by SIT, language counts for very little. Significantly, in the design of the original experiments upon which this approach was founded (Tajfel, 1978), whether two group members communicate at all, let alone share the same language, is non-pertinent. It is enough that two individuals should know (say because they have been told so in their respec­tive languages for the purposes of the experiment) that they belong to the same group for them to favour one another over a third individual. The primary determinant of individual behaviour thus emphasized is a pre-verbal, primordial desire to belong, which seems closer to pack animal behaviour than to anything distinctly human. What the group stands for, what specific set of meanings and values binds it together, is unimportant. What matters primarily is that the group is valued positively, since posi­tive valuation is what returns accrued self-esteem to the individual. In IR Jonathan Mercer’s (2005) account of the relationship between identity, emotion and behaviour reads more like a series of buttons mechanically pushed in a sequence of the sort: posi­tive identification produces emotion (such as trust), which in turn generates specific patterns of in-/out-group discrimination. Similarly, Trine Flockhart (2006: 96) approaches the socializee’s ‘desire to belong’ in terms of the psychological (and ultimately social) benefits and the feel-good factor that accrues from increased self-esteem. At the far opposite of Lacan, the concept of desire here is reduced to a Benthamite type of pleasure- or utility-maximization where mean­ing is nowhere to be seen. More telling still is the need to downplay the role of the Other in justifying her initial resort to SIT. For Flockhart (2006: 94), in a post-Cold War con­text, ‘identities cannot be constructed purely in relation to the “Other”’. Perhaps so; but not if what ‘the other’ refers to is the generic, dynamic scheme undergirding the very concept of identity. At issue here is the confusion between the reference to a specific other, for which Lacan coined the concept of *le petit autre*, and the reference to *l’Autre*, or Other, which is that symbolic instance that is essential to the making of *all* selves. As such it is not clear what meaning Flockhart’s (2006: 94) capitalization of the ‘Other’ actually holds. The individual self as a proxy for the state’s self Another way in which the concept of self has been centrally involved in circumventing the level-of-analysis problem in IR has been to treat the self of the individual as a proxy for the self of the state. The literature on norms in particular has highlighted the role of individuals in orchestrating norm shifts, in both the positions of socializer (norm entre­preneurs) and socializee. It has shown for example how some state leaders are more sus­ceptible than others to concerns about reputation and legitimacy and thus more amenable to being convinced of the need to adopt a new norm, of human rights or democratization, for example (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Risse, 2001). It is these specific psychological qualities pertaining to their selves (for example, those of Gorbachev; Risse, 2001) that ultimately enable the norm shift to occur. Once again the individual self ultimately remains the basis for explaining the change in state behaviour. To summarize the points made so far, whether the state is literally considered as a person by ontological overreach, whether so only by analogy, or whether the person stands as a proxy for the state, the ‘self’ of that person has been consistently taken as the reference point for studying state identities. Both in Wendt’s states-as-persons thesis, and in the broader psychological turn within constructivism and beyond, the debate has con­sistently revolved around the need to evaluate which of the essentialist assumptions about human nature are the most useful for explaining state behaviour. It has never ques­tioned the validity of starting from these assumptions in the first place. That is, what is left unexamined is this assumption is that what works for individuals will work for states too. This is IR’s central fallacy of composition, by which it has persistently eschewed rather than resolved the level-of-analysis problem. Indeed, in the absence of a clear dem­onstration of a logical identity (of the type A=A) between states and individuals, the assumption that individual interactions will explain what states do rests on little more than a leap of faith, or indeed an analogy.

#### The term middle passage sanitizes the slave experience, making it seem like a pleasure cruise.

Assata Shakur 10 (Revolutionary Daily Thoughts, <http://groups.yahoo.com/group/RevolutionaryDailyThoughts/message/2082>)

"**Many of us recognize that the term "Middle Passage" is no more than a euphemism softening the horrendous psychological feeling** that part of the Maafa spent on the Kemetic Ocean naturally brings. We know that **for untrained ears it subconsciously feels more like a mundane leisure cruise than the horrid journey that it was. "Middle" in no way connotes the horror Afrikans experienced. It is a neutral word indicating nothing more than location (middle – between Afrika and this land), while "passage" indicates only a place traveled**."

#### The term middle passage implies a straightforward and linear temporal narrative—one which was denied to the slave and utilized by market forces to commodify entire West African populations .

Smallwood 8 (Stephanie, Journal of American Studies, 42(2008))

The most satisfying section of the book considers the psychological impact of the Middle Passage. Smallwood argues convincingly **that the market forces of enslavement and commodiﬁcation deﬁned a straightforward temporal narrative of slavery for Europeans (as implied by the term ‘‘Middle Passage ’’), a narrative that was denied to slaves. The very alienness of the ocean, which for land-based West African cultures was a place of supernatural power, caused slaves spatial and temporal disorientation, and contributed to their commodiﬁcation, and to ‘‘the complete disintegration of personhood ’’**

#### Wilderson constructs an ungendered black subject which fails to accurately describe violence against black flesh and ignores the female black body

**Hodges 2012** – Asia Hodges University of California Irvine, African American Studies, [*Mama’s Baby & the Black Gender Problematic*](http://www.academia.edu/2027925/Mamas_Baby_and_the_Black_Gender_Problematic)

<http://www.academia.edu/2027925/Mamas_Baby_and_the_Black_Gender_Problematic>

Asia Nichole Hodges Undergraduate Critical Theory Conference 2012 Mentor: Tamara Beauchamp Mama’s Baby & the Black Gender Problematic For me, this paper represents an opportunity to bring focus to the ungendered black subject of afropessimist thought, a concept I was first introduced to in winter quarter of 2011, which was the most theoretically rich coursework I have ever undertaken. In retrospect, the work of Frank Wilderson, III also appeared at a very critical moment in my development, both as a thinker and as a black woman engaged in organizing around issues affecting the black community on campus as well as back home. Afropessimist thought resonated deeply because it spoke to the terrifying truths of antiblack racism, black structural positionality and black life, corroborating my own experience but more importantly providing the language and a framework through which to approach a more thorough explanation of this experience theoretically. Further, when I use the term ‘’black” I mean it in the sense closest to the truth of the paradigm of afropessimist thought as described by Wilderson in Red, White & Black: Cinema & the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms. It is my intent to critique Wilderson’s argument for an ungendered black subject using the work of black feminist scholar, Hortense Spillers, and explore the categories she protects in her work. She is indispensible here not only because she was an impetus for Wilderson’s project, but also because it was her thought that mothered my own. In conversation with the seminal article of Hortense Spillers, Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe: An American Grammar Book, Wilderson explains that, for him, antiblackness functions as a prohibition on gender, thus the black subject is inherently genderless. He writes, “Gratuitous violence relegates the Slave to the taxonomy, the list of things. That is, it reduces the Slave to an object. Motherhood, fatherhood, and gender differentiations can only be sustained in the taxonomy of subjects.”1 While this framework has helped me to understand of the structuring properties of violence, and grasp its role in subject formation more generally, this explanation features an ungendered black subject and cannot be extended to the truth of my life as a black and as a female. This is not to say that afropessimism does not hold the potential to speak to the effect of antiblackness on gender. To the contrary, it was Spillers who first argued that such work was fruitful, writing that in “undressing these conflations of meaning, as they appear under the rule of dominance… we would gain… the potential for gender differentiation as it might express itself along a range of stress points, including human biology in its intersection with the project of culture.”2 Both Wilderson and Spillers take the dereliction of the black from civil society as their point of departure, but in many ways, Spillers has offered us a great deal more than we know what to do with on Wilderson, III, Frank B., Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010, 136. 2 Spillers, Hortense. "Mama's Baby, Papa's Maybe."Diacritics. (1987): 66. Print. 1 matters of gender and antiblackness. In Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe she theorizes that there is a profundity to the particularities of the position of the female black that is exemplified through regimes of naming. In the spirit of black feminism, though its ensemble of questions cannot help me here, I must occasion an explanation of black positionality that accounts for the manner of existential negation and the modes of violence which position me, moving beyond the concerns with black patriarchy. Theoretically, antiblackness does not only lend itself to an argument against a gendered understanding of my condition, it also offers an opportunity for a more nuanced understanding of gender itself. This begs the question, what does a genderless black subject help us to understand that a more complicated rendering [or gendering] of the black subject would obscure? In my view, black political thought lags here, unable to describe its condition without relegating the particularities of the female black to the abyss. Moreover, it seems the black female labors in service of civil society in ways we have yet to fully understand. Spillers supports an argument for the necessity of this work in building a more robust theoretical foundation for black political thought, and afropessimism could be our point of departure. For Wilderson, there is a line of recognition and incorporation. Above it are human beings, civil society made up of white men and women, and below it is the black in absolute dereliction, a concept he draws from Frantz Fanon writings on the black condition. I mean to suggest that the distinction we’re looking for under the line of recognition and incorporation is not “man” and “woman”, which Wilderson would reject, but that is not to say there is no distinction to be made whatsoever. It seems we may too hastily disregard the possibility for distinction for three reasons, described loosely as outlined by Spillers: 1) there was no distinction made between male and female slaves on the ships, 2) men and women performed the same hard, physical labor and lastly, 3) gender is a category requiring the symbolic integrity from which the black is barred. I am unable to go into each in detail here, but the validity of these points of contention is not what is in question for Spillers. The distinctions made on ships or on fields are not the only sites we should scourer for insight into the black gender problematic, and evidence that captives are not regarded as “men” and “women,” like their captors, is elucidating but not explanatory. In Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe, Spillers uses naming as a point of entry into black gender problematic. She revisits Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s report on the state of the black community in America during the late 1960s, and meditates on the significance of black women emerging as the locus of black pathology. She writes that for Moynihan, “the ‘Negro Family’ has no Father to speak of—his Name, his Symbolic function mark the impressive missing agencies in the essential life of the black community… and it is, surprisingly, the fault of the Daughter, or the female line”. Thus, it is the “displacing [of] the Name and the Law of the father to the territory of the Mother and Daughter [that] becomes an aspect of the African-American female’s misnaming.”3 The black is without the gendered symbolic integrity that the subjects of civil society enjoy; the black performs to both genders, as well as anything in between and beyond, and is not granted the protections of motherhood or the entitlements of fatherhood for example. Moynihan observes the behavior of the black family and concludes that it is a manifestation of the backwardness of blackness generally, and the pathology of black women in particular. But a structural analysis would include a discussion of historical context, relations to power and positionality, with an understanding of the black as positioned through the violence of captivity. Moreover, the emergence of the female black marks the divergence between chattel slavery and racial slavery. Peter Wood, professor of history at Duke University, explains that partus sequitir ventrem, “that which is brought forth follows the womb”, is a legal doctrine which mandates that the child follows the status of the mother, or rather in the case of the female black, her child is doomed to captivity. Woods notes that there was a “shift from indentured servitude to lifelong slavery to heredity slavery, where not only am I enslaved but my children as well” and emphasizes that it was indeed “a remarkable shift”4. However, the problem is not that we do not know this history, but rather we have not dealt with it theoretically, and even in the most likely 3 4 Ibid, 66. of discourses, particularity on the basis of sex is not explored. In chapter 11 of Red, White and Black, Wilderson takes up the issue of gender and sex under captivity, but largely leaves the work Spillers does in Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe untouched. Earlier in the chapter, she is employed as support for Wilderson’s claim that the position of white women and black females are made distinct as a direct consequence of captivity. However, when Wilderson addresses blackness and gender, specifically gender ontology and the reification of gender, Spillers absence is haunting. Moreover, the effect of captivity on gender is not simply a reversal of power between the categories of “man” and “woman” as suggested by Moynihan, but rather that these categories are in fact eviscerated entirely where the black is concerned. Though the black does not hold the symbolic integrity for gender normativity, as argued by both Wilderson and Spillers, the categories of male and female are still apt here; “man” and “woman” representing the body and the latter, eviscerated categories, representing Spillers’ notion of the flesh. She writes: Before there is the ‘body’ there is the ‘flesh,’ that zero degree of social conceptualization that does not escape concealment under the brush of discourse, or the reflexes of iconography. Even though the European hegemonies stole bodies—some of them female… we regard this human and social irreparability as high crimes against the flesh, as a person of African females and African males registered the wounding. 5 Here, Spillers shows that the violence of captivity registers on multiple levels, and of course that the violence can be understood from multiple registers, however the flesh that registers the wounding is sexed, the violence at times sexualized. So how, then, does the female black function within the structure, positioned through regimes of sexualized violence? My project is to seek answers to the questions developed here by acquiescing to the chasms in our understanding. I do not aim to fill the chasm here, but only to make the conceptual leap and let the matter remain unresolved so that we might titter on the edge and engage further with the black gender problematic. To conclude, the closing thoughts of Spillers in Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe, “The female breaks in upon the imagination with a forcefulness that marks both a denial and an ‘illegitimacy’… In this play of paradox, only the female stands in the flesh, both mother and mother-dispossessed. This problematizing of gender places her, in my view, out of the traditional symbolics of female gender, and it is our task to make a place for this different social subject.“ 5 Spillers, 67.

#### This privileging of the Black male body and IGNORANCE of the sexism that exists within the Black body reintrenches both racism and patriarchal dominance providing harm to the very groups they attempt to save

Shama Farooq quoting Bell Hooks in 96

(<http://www.tulane.edu/~feminist/readingnotes27.html>, “Bell Hooks: “Feminism: Its a Black Thing”, Reading Notes

In this chapter of her book Beyond Black Rage, Bell Hooks discusses the tendency of black males to downplay sexism in comparison to racism. She points out that sexism crosses racial borders and exists in the black mind as well. Bell Hooks criticizes those blacks who deny/downplay the existence of the negative effects of sexism outside race/racism. She is also extremely wary of institutions that might help teach a "patriarchal pedagogy" to young black males and endorse sexist values. She further suggests a course of action to address this issue. Bell Hooks begins her article by saying that many black males see the sexism black women face as only "natural" and a "dysfunctional response to racism rather than a perspective that exists both apart from and in conjunction with racism" (86). This allows black males to focus only on the racism of white supremacist patriarchy and disregard the privileges they possess due to their maleness. Furthermore, black males can't be blames for the sexism in society since they didn't create it. In remaining silent on sexism, Bell Hooks believes these men "reinscribe the assumption that sexist brutality cannot change or be eradicated" (88). In doing so, they also assist white supremacists who are then able to focus on "black 'bestial' masculinity" and thus sexism and patriarchy are maintained (89). Next, Bell Hooks points out that while young black males are often able to identify with positive black role models, no one is concerned with the need for young black females to be able to identify with positive black role models. Also, young black males are not presented with black female role models to identify with. She then discusses the "militaristic emphasis on discipline" in schools for black males (90). Bell Hooks cites Daniel Patrick Moynihan and says such school are based on the notion that black males are "emasculated and castrated by strong black females who prevented them from realizing manhood" (90). Thus, these schools teach black males to use a discipline and punish model to subordinate black women who do not conform to their expectations (91). Bell Hooks goes on to say there is no evidence that black males who are "successful" in life do not commit sexism (that militaristic schools erase patriarchal tendencies). Black men, she claims, continue to perpetuate sexism along with white males because they receive more attention from the "dominant culture" and because they are able to "strengthen their alliances with white males" (92). Bell Hooks points out that homophobic thinking sometimes prevents blacks from learning about feminism. Furthermore, those black women who refuse to support sexism within the black race-like Alice Walker-are condemned as traitors to the black race. She accuses mainstream consumer culture for creating the demand for sexist/misogynist products like rap music (94). In conclusion, Bell Hooks suggests some courses of action. She says that "individual, progressive black heterosexual males" must be more willing to take feminist thinking more seriously and to act politically against oppressive patriarchal regimes (95). She mentions the importance of working in conjunction with black women who challenge sexism and of whole hearted efforts to end sexism within black communities. Bell Hooks claims that sexist black males, if exposed to feminist thinking will realize that patriarchy ultimately oppresses them too. She stresses the need for black men willing "to look at gender and race with new eyes" (96).

# 2nc

## Marx

### 2NC – Link Overview

#### They commodify and fetishize the native American experience – displaces radical criticisms of capitalism and colonialism

Aldred, Montana State University, Center for Native American Studies, professor, 2000

(Lisa, “Plastic Shamans and Astroturf Sun Dances New Age Commercialization of Native American Spirituality,” American Indian Quarterly, volume: 24, no. 3, SCL)

**The subjectivities of human experience produced under capitalism leads to feelings of alienation. Yet people increasingly think of themselves and others as akin to commodities. Purchasable lifestyles are mistaken for communities**. So**, driven by the quest for some kind of community and historical tradition, New Agers fetishize Native Americans and their religio-cultural practices.** Yet **the only way they know how to achieve the attributes that they project onto Native Americans is through commercialization and purchase.** This cycle does not end their alienation. **They are still so removed from any recognition of social relations** (much less historical conflict) that **they cannot understand why Native American peoples themselves would object to their appropriations. The individualism that has become characteristic of both capitalism and American political ideology cannot fathom political and social accountability.** Yet the kind of community New Agers so desperately seek to relieve their feelings of isolation would, in my view, not be defined by superficial trappings, but by col- lective accountability. Despite the New Agers’ professions that they are working toward social and cultural change, **their commercialization of Native American spirituality articulates well within late-twentieth-century consumer capitalism**. There is strong historical and social evidence that **the commercialization of ideas and values, as well as the fetishized image of a social body perceived to be ethnically Other, stems in part from thought and practices produced within the context of recent consumer capitalism**. Although the New Age spiritualists identify themselves as countercultural, their uncritical ideas about commercialization and marketing practices appear to have been shaped by the larger capitalist market economy. Moreover, **their imperialistically nostalgic fetishization of Native American spirituality hinders any recognition of their own historical and so- cial complicity in the oppression of indigenous peoples.**

**Their turns the case – causes interpassivity and their suffering becomes a commodity circulated for the purchase of the ballot**

**DAVILA in 2002** (Juan, Artist, http://www.abc.net.au/arts/visual/stories/s534433.htm)

Alberto Moreiras and Slavoj Zizek argue that **late capitalism disavows the experience of the other**. The erasure of the public and the private domains makes it very difficult to remain open to the other. **We are conditioned not to act, not to intervene, and not to change. Instead we have pseudo- radical topics, frenetic humanism, liberal paranoia, commerce and passivity.** In this paranoid universe of ours capitalism legitimizes itself through anti-capitalist ideology: renounce the endeavour of relating to the world, have control through indifference and distance, reject upheaval as foreign to our inner selves. To be dehumanized buyers, full of choices is our noble work in the spectacle of our "real world". In Australia today we have concentration camps to detain refugees. We demand that they justify themselves. We have created a modern master and a non-modern slave. Ashis Nandi says that the slave "represents a higher-order cognition which perforce includes the master as human, whereas the master's cognition has to exclude the slave as a 'thing'. Ultimately, modern oppression, as opposed to traditional oppression, is not an encounter between the self and the enemy, the rulers and the ruled, or the gods and the demons. It is a battle between dehumanized self and the objectified enemy, the technologized bureaucrat and his reified victim, pseudo-rulers and their fearsome selves projected on to their 'subjects'". Australia is joined with the USA in an obscene pact of military bonding - the war of Western civilizations against the barbaric others. As Moreiras and Zizek argue, it seems that **our culture requires for its survival a vilified figure** like the refugee. He or she seems to be complete and that is intolerable, since they inhabit the borders of capitalism. We disavow their lack. **We steal from them (their rights, their freedom, their name, their family) to pretend that they are indeed complete. We are in love: we steal what they do not possess. We dupe them, we put their symbolic treasure in circulation for political gain**, to confirm the need for the virtual spectacle of war. **Like a market commodity they are outsourced.** In a mass delusion we use deception in the guise of truth. We delegate belief to the politician's discourse and deprive ourselves of the naïve belief in the other.

#### Racism was created to protect the labor production of chattel slavery – it was manufactured by elites as a means of protecting their interests – anti-racism strategies are co-opted and divide resistance – universal consciousness is key

**Alexander 10** (The new Jim Crow: mass incarceration in the age of colorblindness, Michelle Alexander is an associate professor of law at [Ohio State University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ohio_State_University) and a [civil rights](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_and_political_rights) advocate, who has litigated numerous [class action](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Class_action) discrimination cases and has worked on [criminal justice](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criminal_justice) reform issues. She is a recipient of a 2005 Soros Justice Fellowship of the [Open Society Institute](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_Society_Institute), has served as director of the Racial Justice Project at the [ACLU](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Civil_Liberties_Union) of Northern [California](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/California), directed the Civil Rights Clinic at [Stanford](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanford_University) Law School and was a law clerk for Justice [Harry Blackmun](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harry_Blackmun) at the [U. S. Supreme Court](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supreme_Court_of_the_United_States).)

The concept of race is a relatively recent development. Only in the past few centuries, owing largely to European imperialism, have the world’s people been classified along racial lines. Here, in America, the idea of race emerged as a means of reconciling chattel slavery- as well as the extermination of American Indians – with the ideals of freedom preached by whites in the new colonies. In the early colonial period, when settlements remained relatively small, indentured servitude was the dominant means of securing cheap labor. Under this system, whites and blacks struggled to survive against a common enemy, what historian Lerone Bennett Jr. describes as “the big planter apparatus and a social system that legalized terror against black and white bondsmen.” Initially, blacks brought to this country were not all enslaved; many were treated as indentured servants. As plantation farming expanded, particularly tobacco and cotton farming, demand increased greatly for both labor and land. The demand for land was met by invading and conquering larger and large swaths of territory. American Indians became a growing impediment to white European “progress,” and during this period, the images of American Indians promoted in books, newspapers, and magazines became increasingly negative. As sociologists Keith Kilty and Eric Swank have observed, eliminating “savages” is less of a moral problem than eliminating human beings, and therefore American Indians came to be understood as a lesser race- uncivilized savages- thus providing a justification for the extermination of the native peoples. The growing demand for labor on plantations was met through slavery. American Indians were considered unsuitable as slaves, largely because native tribes were clearly in a position to fight back. The fear of raids by Indian tribes left plantation owners to grasp for an alternative source of free labor. European immigrants were also deemed poor candidates for slavery, not because of their race, but rather because they were in short supply and enslavement would, quite naturally, interfere with voluntary immigration to the new colonies. Plantation owners thus view Africans, who were relatively powerless, as the ideal slaves. The systemic enslavement of Africans, and the rearing of their children under bondage, emerged with all deliberate speed- quickened by events such as Bacon’s Rebellion. Nathaniel Bacon was a white property owner in Jamestown, Virginia, who managed to united slaves, indentured servants, and poor whites in a revolutionary effort to overthrow the planter elite. Although slaves clearly occupied the lowest position in the social hierarchy and suffered the most under the plantation, the condition of indentured whites was barely better, and the majority of free whites lived in extreme poverty. As explained by historian Edmund Morgan, in colonies like Virginia, the planter elite, with huge land grants, occupied a vastly superior position to workers of all colors. Southern colonies did not hesitate to invent ways to extend the terms of servitude, and the planter class accumulated uncultivated lands to restrict the options of free workers. The simmering resentment against the planter class created conditions that were ripe for revolt. Varying accounts of Bacon’s rebellion abound, but the basic facts are these: Bacon developed plans in 1675 to seize Native American lands in order to acquire more property for himself and others and nullify the threat of Indian raids. When the planter elite in Virginia refused to provide militia support for his scheme, Bacon retaliated, leading to an attack on the elite, their homes, and their property. He openly condemned the rich for their oppression of the poor and inspired an alliance of white and black bond laborers, as well as slaves, who demanded an end to their servitude. The attempted revolution was ended by force and false promises of amnesty. A number of the people who participated in the revolt were hanged. The events in Jamestown were alarming to the planter elite, who were deeply fearful of the multiracial alliance of bond workers and slave. Word of Bacon’s rebellion spread far and wide, and several more uprisings of a similar type followed. In an effort to protect their superior status and economic position, the planters shifted their strategy for maintaining dominance. They abandoned their heavy reliance on indentured servants in favor of the importation of more black slaves. Instead of importing English-speaking slaves from the West Indies, who were more likely to be familiar with European language and culture, many more slaves were shipped directly from Africa. These slaves would be far easier to control and far less likely to form alliances with poor whites. Fearful that such measures might not be sufficient to protect their interests, the planter class took an additional precautionary step, a step that would later come to be known as a “racial bribe.” Deliberately and strategically, the planter class extended special privileges to poor whites in an effort to drive a wedge between them and black slaves. White settlers were allowed greater access to Native American lands, white servants were allowed to police slaves through slave patrols and militias, and barriers were created so that free labor would not be placed in competition with slave labor. These measures effectively eliminated the risk of future alliances between black slaves and poor whites. Poor whites suddenly had a direct, personal stake in the existence of a race-based system of slavery. Their own plight had not improved by much, but at least they were not slaves. Once the planter elite split the labor force, poor whites responded to the logic of their situation and sought ways to expand their racially privileged position. By the mid-1770s, the system of bond labor had been thoroughly transformed into a racial caste system predicated on slavery. The degraded status of Africans was justified on the ground that Negros, like the Indians, were an uncivilized lesser race, perhaps even more lacking in intelligence and laudable human qualities than the red-skinned natives. The notion of white supremacy rationalized the enslavement of Africans, even as whites endeavored to form a new nation based on the ideals of equality, liberty, and justice for all. Before democracy, chattel slavery was born.

## Method bad

#### The way to resolve internal exclusion is to broaden the scope of what counts as a persuasive argument within a given topic---for example, our model of debate would welcome the use of narrative and personal experience on behalf of a topical argument---this middle ground most effectively resolves their exclusion arguments ---- Establishing constraints on the topics for discussion in debate does not cause internal exclusion and breaking down those constraints doesn’t solve it because the absence of clash and the refusal of the burden of rejoinder only flips external exclusion---

Gert Biesta et al 9, professor of Education and Director of Research at the School of Education, University of Stirling, Susan Verducci , Assistant Professor at the Humanities Department at San José State University, and Michael S. Katz, professor of philosophy and education at San Jose State, Education, Democracy and the Moral Life, 2009, p. 105-107

This example not only shows why the issue of inclusion is so prominent in the deliberative model. It also explains why the deliberative turn has generated a whole new set of issues around inclusion. The reason for this is that deliberation is not simply a form of political decision-making but first and foremost a form of political communication. The inclusion question in deliberative democracy is therefore not so much a question about who should be included - although this question should be asked always as well. It is first and foremost a question about who is able to participate effectively in deliberation. As Dryzek aptly summarises, the suspicion about deliberative democracy is "that its focus on a particular kind of reasonable political interaction is not in fact neutral, but systematically excludes a variety of voices from effective participation in democratic politics" (Dryzek, 2000, p.58). In this regard Young makes a helpful distinction between two forms of exclusion: external exclusion, which is about "how people arc [actually] kept outside the process of discussion and decision-making", and internal exclusion where people are formally included in decision-making processes but where they may find, for example, "that their claims are not taken seriously and may believe that they are not treated with equal respect" (Young, 2000, p.55). Internal exclusion, in other words, refers to those situations in which people "lack effective opportunity to influence the thinking of others even when they have access to fora and procedures of decision-making" (ibid.) which can particularly be the outcome of the emphasis of some proponents of deliberative democracy on "dispassionate, unsituatcd, neutral reason" (ibid. p.63). To counteract the internal exclusion that is the product of a too narrow focus on argument, Young has suggested several other modes of political communication which should be added to the deliberative process not only to remedy "exclusionary tendencies in deliberative practices" but also to promote "respect and trust" and to make possible "understanding across structural and cultural difference" (ibid. p.57). The first of these is greeting or public acknowledgement. This is about "communicative political gestures through which those who have conflicts . .. recognize others as included in the discussion, especially those with whom they differ in opinion, interest, or social location" (ibid., p.61; emphasis in original). Young emphasises that greeting should be thought of as a starting-point for political interaction. It "precedes the giving and evaluating of reasons" (ibid., p.79) and does so through the recognition of the other parties in the deliberation. The second mode of political communication is rhetoric and more specifically the affirmative use of rhetoric (ibid., p.63). Although one could say that rhetoric only concerns the form of political communication and not its content, the point Young makes is that inclusive political communication should pay attention to and be inclusive about the different forms of expression and should not try to purify rational argument from rhetoric. Rhetoric is not only important because it can help to get particular issues on the agenda for deliberation. Rhetoric can also help to articulate claims and arguments "in ways appropriate to a particular public in a particular situation' (ibid., p.67; emphasis in original). Rhetoric always accompanies an argument by situating it "for a particular audience and giving it embodied style and tone" (ibid., p.79). Young's third mode of political communication is narrative or storytelling. The main function of narrative in democratic communication lies in its potential "to foster understanding among members of a polity with very different experience or assumptions about what is important" (ibid., p.71). Young emphasises the role of narrative in the teaching and learning dimension of political communication. "Inclusive democratic communication", so she argues, "assumes that all participants have something to teach the public about the society in which they dwell together" and also assumes "that all participants are ignorant of some aspects of the social or natural world, and that everyone comes to a political conflict with some biases, prejudices, blind spots, or sterco-types" (ibid., p.77). It is important to emphasise that greeting, rhetoric and narrative are not meant to replace argumentation. Young stresses again and again that deliberative democracy entails "that participants require reasons of one another and critically evaluate them" (ibid., p.79). Other proponents of the deliberative model take a much more narrow approach and see deliberation exclusively as a form of rational argumentation (e.g. Bcnhabib, 1996) where the only legitimate force should be the "forceless force of the better argument" (Habermas). Similarly, Dryzck, after a discussion of Young's ideas,1 concludes that argument always has to be "central to deliberative democracy" (Dryzek, 2000, p.7l). Although he acknowledges that other modes of communication can be present and that there are good reasons to welcome them, their status is different "because they do not have to be present" (ibid., emphasis added). For Dryzek, at the end of the day, all modes of political communication must live up to the standards of rationality. This does not mean that they must be subordinated to rational argument “but their deployment only makes sense in a context where argument about what is to be done remains central” (ibid., p.168).

## Middle passage

#### The term middle passage sanitizes the slave experience, making it seem like a pleasure cruise.

Assata Shakur 10 (Revolutionary Daily Thoughts, <http://groups.yahoo.com/group/RevolutionaryDailyThoughts/message/2082>)

"**Many of us recognize that the term "Middle Passage" is no more than a euphemism softening the horrendous psychological feeling** that part of the Maafa spent on the Kemetic Ocean naturally brings. We know that **for untrained ears it subconsciously feels more like a mundane leisure cruise than the horrid journey that it was. "Middle" in no way connotes the horror Afrikans experienced. It is a neutral word indicating nothing more than location (middle – between Afrika and this land), while "passage" indicates only a place traveled**."

#### The term middle passage implies a straightforward and linear temporal narrative—one which was denied to the slave and utilized by market forces to commodify entire West African populations .

Smallwood 8 (Stephanie, Journal of American Studies, 42(2008))

The most satisfying section of the book considers the psychological impact of the Middle Passage. Smallwood argues convincingly **that the market forces of enslavement and commodiﬁcation deﬁned a straightforward temporal narrative of slavery for Europeans (as implied by the term ‘‘Middle Passage ’’), a narrative that was denied to slaves. The very alienness of the ocean, which for land-based West African cultures was a place of supernatural power, caused slaves spatial and temporal disorientation, and contributed to their commodiﬁcation, and to ‘‘the complete disintegration of personhood ’’**

#### Also – natives Terms used to classify are an oversimplification and destroy the individual cultures – instead refer to their self acknowledged groups

Berry 6 (Christian Berry, Cherokee writer and producer of AllThingsCherokee.com, <http://www.allthingscherokee.com/articles\_culture\_events\_070101.html> accessed Oct 31 2007)

In the end, the term you choose to use (as an Indian or non-Indian) is your own personal choice. ... Very few Indians that I know care either way. The recommended method is to refer to a person by their tribe, if that information is known. The reason is that the Native peoples of North America are incredibly diverse. It would be like referring to both a Romanian and an Irishman as European. It's true that they are both from Europe, but their people have very different histories, cultures, and languages. The same is true of Indians. The Cherokee are vastly different from the Lakota, the Dine, the Kiowa, and the Cree, but they are all labeled Native American. So whenever possible an Indian would prefer to be called a Cherokee or a Lakota or whichever tribe they belong to. This shows respect because not only are the terms Indian, American Indian, and Native American an over simplification of a diverse ethnicity, but you also show that you listened when they told what tribe they belonged to.

## Root Cause

#### Libidinal economy doesn’t explain violence

Carel 6

Havi Carel 6, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of the West of England, “Life and Death in Freud and Heidegger”, googlebooks

Secondly, the constancy principle on which these ideas are based is incompatible with observational data. Once the passive model of the nervous system has been discarded, there was no need for external excitation in order for discharge to take place, and more generally, "the behavioural picture seemed to negate the notion of drive, as a separate energizer of behaviour" {Hcbb. 1982. p.35). According to Holt, the nervous system is not passive; it does not take in and conduct out energy from the environment, and it shows no tendency to discharge its impulses. 'The principle of constancy is quite without any biological basis" (1965, p. 109). He goes on to present the difficulties that arise from the pleasure principle as linked to a tension-reduction theory. The notion of tension is "conveniently ambiguous": it has phenomenological, physiological and abstract meaning. But empirical evidence against the theory of tension reduction has been "mounting steadily" and any further attempts to link pleasure with a reduction of physiological tension are "decisively refuted" (1965, pp. 1102). Additionally, the organism and the mental system are no longer considered closed systems. So the main arguments for the economic view collapse, as does the entropic argument for the death drive (1965, p. 114). A final, more general criticism of Freud's economic theory is sounded by Compton, who argues, "Freud fills in psychological discontinuities with neurological hypotheses" (1981, p. 195). The Nirvana principle is part and parcel of the economic view and the incomplete and erroneous assumptions about the nervous system (Hobson, 1988, p.277). It is an extension ad extremis of the pleasure principle, and as such is vulnerable to all the above criticisms. The overall contemporary view provides strong support for discarding the Nirvana principle and reconstructing the death drive as aggression.

#### No empirical basis for scaling up psychoanalysis

Epstein, senior lecturer in government and IR – University of Sydney, ‘10

(Charlotte, “Who speaks? Discourse, the subject and the study of identity in international politics,” European Journal of International Relations XX(X) 1–24)

One key advantage of the Wendtian move, granted even by his critics (see Flockhart, 2006), is that it simply does away with the level-of-analysis problem altogether. If states really are persons, then we can apply everything we know about people to understand how they behave. The study of individual identity is not only theoretically justified but it is warranted. This cohesive self borrowed from social psychology is what allows Wendt to bridge the different levels of analysis and travel between the self of the individual and that of the state, by way of a third term, ‘group self’, which is simply an aggregate of individual selves. Thus for Wendt (1999: 225) ‘the state is simply a “group Self” capable of group level cognition’. Yet that the individual possesses a self does not logically entail that the state possesses one too. It is in this leap, from the individual to the state, that IR’s fallacy of composition surfaces most clearly. Moving beyond Wendt but maintaining the psychological self as the basis for theorizing the state Wendt’s bold ontological claim is far from having attracted unanimous support (see nota­bly, Flockhart, 2006; Jackson, 2004; Neumann, 2004; Schiff, 2008; Wight, 2004). One line of critique of the states-as-persons thesis has taken shape around the resort to psy­chological theories, specifically, around the respective merits of Identity Theory (Wendt) and SIT (Flockhart, 2006; Greenhill, 2008; Mercer, 2005) for understanding state behav­iour.9 Importantly for my argument, that the state has a self, and that this self is pre-social, remains unquestioned in this further entrenching of the psychological turn. Instead questions have revolved around how this pre-social self (Wendt’s ‘Ego’) behaves once it encounters the other (Alter): whether, at that point (and not before), it takes on roles prescribed by pre-existing cultures (whether Hobbessian, Lockean or Kantian) or whether instead other, less culturally specific, dynamics rooted in more universally human char­acteristics better explain state interactions. SIT in particular emphasizes the individual’s basic need to belong, and it highlights the dynamics of in-/out-group categorizations as a key determinant of behaviour (Billig, 2004). SIT seems to have attracted increasing interest from IR scholars, interestingly, for both critiquing (Greenhill, 2008; Mercer, 1995) and rescuing constructivism (Flockhart, 2006). For Trine Flockart (2006: 89–91), SIT can provide constructivism with a different basis for developing a theory of agency that steers clear of the states-as-persons thesis while filling an important gap in the socialization literature, which has tended to focus on norms rather than the actors adopting them. She shows that a state’s adherence to a new norm is best understood as the act of joining a group that shares a set of norms and val­ues, for example the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). What SIT draws out are the benefits that accrue to the actor from belonging to a group, namely increased self-esteem and a clear cognitive map for categorizing other states as ‘in-’ or ‘out-group’ members and, from there, for orientating states’ self–other relationships. Whilst coming at it from a stance explicitly critical of constructivism, for Jonathan Mercer (2005: 1995) the use of psychology remains key to correcting the systematic evacuation of the role of emotion and other ‘non-rational’ phenomena in rational choice and behaviourist analyses, which has significantly impaired the understanding of inter­national politics. SIT serves to draw out the emotional component of some of the key drivers of international politics, such as trust, reputation and even choice (Mercer, 2005: 90–95; see also Mercer, 1995). Brian Greenhill (2008) for his part uses SIT amongst a broader array of psychological theories to analyse the phenomenon of self–other recog­nition and, from there, to take issue with the late Wendtian assumption that mutual recognition can provide an adequate basis for the formation of a collective identity amongst states. The main problem with this psychological turn is the very utilitarian, almost mecha­nistic, approach to non-rational phenomena it proposes, which tends to evacuate the role of meaning. In other words, it further shores up the pre-social dimension of the concept of self that is at issue here. Indeed norms (Flockhart, 2006), emotions (Mercer, 2005) and recognition (Greenhill, 2008) are hardly appraised as symbolic phenomena. In fact, in the dynamics of in- versus out-group categorization emphasized by SIT, language counts for very little. Significantly, in the design of the original experiments upon which this approach was founded (Tajfel, 1978), whether two group members communicate at all, let alone share the same language, is non-pertinent. It is enough that two individuals should know (say because they have been told so in their respec­tive languages for the purposes of the experiment) that they belong to the same group for them to favour one another over a third individual. The primary determinant of individual behaviour thus emphasized is a pre-verbal, primordial desire to belong, which seems closer to pack animal behaviour than to anything distinctly human. What the group stands for, what specific set of meanings and values binds it together, is unimportant. What matters primarily is that the group is valued positively, since posi­tive valuation is what returns accrued self-esteem to the individual. In IR Jonathan Mercer’s (2005) account of the relationship between identity, emotion and behaviour reads more like a series of buttons mechanically pushed in a sequence of the sort: posi­tive identification produces emotion (such as trust), which in turn generates specific patterns of in-/out-group discrimination. Similarly, Trine Flockhart (2006: 96) approaches the socializee’s ‘desire to belong’ in terms of the psychological (and ultimately social) benefits and the feel-good factor that accrues from increased self-esteem. At the far opposite of Lacan, the concept of desire here is reduced to a Benthamite type of pleasure- or utility-maximization where mean­ing is nowhere to be seen. More telling still is the need to downplay the role of the Other in justifying her initial resort to SIT. For Flockhart (2006: 94), in a post-Cold War con­text, ‘identities cannot be constructed purely in relation to the “Other”’. Perhaps so; but not if what ‘the other’ refers to is the generic, dynamic scheme undergirding the very concept of identity. At issue here is the confusion between the reference to a specific other, for which Lacan coined the concept of *le petit autre*, and the reference to *l’Autre*, or Other, which is that symbolic instance that is essential to the making of *all* selves. As such it is not clear what meaning Flockhart’s (2006: 94) capitalization of the ‘Other’ actually holds. The individual self as a proxy for the state’s self Another way in which the concept of self has been centrally involved in circumventing the level-of-analysis problem in IR has been to treat the self of the individual as a proxy for the self of the state. The literature on norms in particular has highlighted the role of individuals in orchestrating norm shifts, in both the positions of socializer (norm entre­preneurs) and socializee. It has shown for example how some state leaders are more sus­ceptible than others to concerns about reputation and legitimacy and thus more amenable to being convinced of the need to adopt a new norm, of human rights or democratization, for example (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Risse, 2001). It is these specific psychological qualities pertaining to their selves (for example, those of Gorbachev; Risse, 2001) that ultimately enable the norm shift to occur. Once again the individual self ultimately remains the basis for explaining the change in state behaviour. To summarize the points made so far, whether the state is literally considered as a person by ontological overreach, whether so only by analogy, or whether the person stands as a proxy for the state, the ‘self’ of that person has been consistently taken as the reference point for studying state identities. Both in Wendt’s states-as-persons thesis, and in the broader psychological turn within constructivism and beyond, the debate has con­sistently revolved around the need to evaluate which of the essentialist assumptions about human nature are the most useful for explaining state behaviour. It has never ques­tioned the validity of starting from these assumptions in the first place. That is, what is left unexamined is this assumption is that what works for individuals will work for states too. This is IR’s central fallacy of composition, by which it has persistently eschewed rather than resolved the level-of-analysis problem. Indeed, in the absence of a clear dem­onstration of a logical identity (of the type A=A) between states and individuals, the assumption that individual interactions will explain what states do rests on little more than a leap of faith, or indeed an analogy.

## Fem

#### Wilderson relies upon Fanon’s use of psychoanalytic reasoning to explain libidinal racism

Wilderson 10

(Frank B. Wilderson, “Wallowing in the contradictions”, Part 1, <http://percy3.wordpress.com/2010/07/09/frank-b-wilderson-%E2%80%9Cwallowing-in-the-contradictions%E2%80%9D-part-1/>, Interview with Percy Howard)

PH As a Psychotherapist, I was very interested to see your contrasting Frantz Fanon and Lacan concerning their conceptualizations of potential paths to “emancipation in the libidinal economy”, as you put it. I am ashamed to admit that I have never read Fanon, but have read Lacan. Please illuminate your idea that the stark difference in their conceptualizations of conflict/antagonism differ are based on the fact that Lacan would still see Blacks as fundamentally situated in personhood, but that Fannon (and yourself) see Blacks as “situated a priori in absolute dereliction”. FW This is a big question, too big for a concise answer—I think I take about thirty to forty pages to try and get my head around this in the book. But the key to the answer lies in the concept of “contemporaries.” Fanon rather painfully and meticulously shows us how the human race is a community of “contemporaries.” In addition, this community vouchsafes its coherence (it knows its borders) through the presence of Blacks. If Blacks became part of the human community then the concept of “contemporaries” would have no outside; and if it had no outside it could have no inside. Lacan assumes the category and thus he imagines the analysand’s problem in terms of how to live without neurosis among ones contemporaries. Fanon interrogates the category itself. For Lacan the analysands suffer psychically due to problems extant within the paradigm of contemporaries. For Fanon, the analysand suffers due to the existence of the contemporaries themselves and the fact that s/he is a stimulus for anxiety for those who have contemporaries. Now, a contemporary’s struggles are conflictual—that is to say, they can be resolved because they are problems that are of- and in the world. But a Blacks problems are the stuff of antagonisms: struggles that cannot be resolved between parties but can only be resolved through the obliteration of one or both of the parties. We are faced—when dealing with the Black—with a set of psychic problems that cannot be resolved through any form of symbolic intervention such as psychoanalysis—though addressing them psychoanalytically we can begin toexplain the antagonism (as I have done in my book, and as Fanon does), but it won’t lead us to a cure.

#### Fanon’s racialized Black subject is built upon the exclusion of potential femininities – it takes male as the norm

Bergner 95

Who Is That Masked Woman? Or, the Role of Gender in Fanon's Black Skin, White Masks Author(s): Gwen Bergner Reviewed work(s): Source: PMLA, Vol. 110, No. 1, Special Topic: Colonialism and the Postcolonial Condition (Jan., 1995), pp. 75-88

Though Black Skin, White Masks is a founda- tional text for reconfiguring psychoanalysis to ac- count for race, Fanon, like Freud, takes the male as the norm. For the exemplary colonized subject, Fanon uses the term le noir 'the black man.' This masculine "universal" refers not to humankind gen- erally, however, but to actual men-since Fanon describes these colonized subjects as studying in Paris, lusting after white women, and competing with white men for intellectual recognition. The French-educated Martinican who appropriates the superiority of the colonizing culture by ostenta- tiously wielding proper French is, by assumption, male: "When he marries, his wife will be aware that she is marrying a joke" 'marie, sa femme saura qu'elle epouse une histoire' (25; 39). That Fanon's"universal" subject describes the colonized male in particular indicates that racial identities **intersect with sexual difference**. Fanon does not ignore sex- ual difference altogether, but he explores sexual- ity's role in constructing race only through rigid categories of gender. In Black Skin, White Masks, women are consid- ered as subjects almost exclusively in terms of their sexual relationships with men; feminine de- sire is thus defined as an overly literal and limited (hetero)sexuality. But though feminine subjectivity clearly deserves broader description, the dimen- sions of its confinement within Black Skin, White Masks indicate the architecture of raced masculin- ity and femininity in the colonial context. So while it is not surprising that Fanon, writing in the early fifties, takes the masculine as the norm, it is neces- sary not only to posit alternative representations of femininity but also to consider how his account of normative raced masculinity depends on the pro- duction or exclusion of femininities. By examining the role of gender in Black Skin, White Masks, I aim to broaden Fanon's outline of black women's subjectivity and to work toward delineating the in- terdependence of race and gender. Although they may emanate from a common construction of oth- erness in psychoanalytic discourses,6 racial differ- ence and sexual difference intersect and interact in contextually variable ways that preclude separate or determinist description.7 Relying on feminist psychoanalytic theory as a model for revising the discourse of psychoanalysis from within, I hope to review Fanon's construction of gender while illu- minating the contributions of his psychoanalytic framework of racial identity. Fanon's almost mythical significance for post- colonial theorists and, more recently, for others gesturing toward multicultural contexts nearly fore- stalls a gender critique of Black Skin, White Masks. In an article tracing Fanon's recuperation as a "global theorist," Gates notes that Fanon is mobi- lized as an "ethnographic construct" and is used as "both totem and text" to model a "unified theory of oppression" (459, 457, 470). Figuring Fanon as transcultural and transhistorical means that "in the course of an appeal for the specificity of the Other, we discover that [Fanon as the] global theorist of alterity is emptied of his own specificity" (459). These invocations do not lead to critical analyses of his work but make the colonial paradigm the "last bastion for the project, and dream, of global the- ory" (469-70). According to Gates, pressing Fanon into the service of a "global theory" of colonialism produces either a "sentimental romance of alterity" complete with a utopian vision of fully achieved in- dependence from the colonial relation or a concep- tion of that relation as a closed, inescapable system. For Gates, these incompatible positions structure the central conflict within colonial discourse the- ory: the tension between utopian narratives of liber- ation and deterministic models of subject formation and discourse formation. To unlock this binary, Gates proposes a more grounded approach that would "historicize" Fanon through biographical critique. Gates would weigh, for example, reports that Fanon did not identify with and even found distasteful the common people of the cultures he championed theoretically and politically. This recourse to the "factual" authority of biog- raphy may demythologize the man but does not disprove his theory or resolve the dilemmas of co- lonial discourse analysis. Fanon's alienation from the local and the "low" is in fact the subject of Black Skin, White Masks; the dialectic between solidarity with and alienation from the colonized population is integral to his analysis of the colo- nially educated black man's psychology. Rather than historicize Fanon, I want to challenge post- colonialism's uses of him and to encourage a deeper engagement with issues of gender-not to consti- tute a better "unified theory of oppression" (Gates 470) but to question the dominant practice of "sep- arate but equal" psychoanalytic discourses of race and gender.

#### Wilderson’s central tenet is that NO OTHER race OR group experiences continued gratuitous violence – he makes a clear claim that the Black Body had it worse

Bruker 11

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal\_of\_film\_and\_video/summary/v063/63.4.bruker.html Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms (review) [Malia Bruker](http://muse.jhu.edu/results?section1=author&search1=Malia%20Bruker) From: [Journal of Film and Video](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_film_and_video) [Volume 63, Number 4, Winter 2011](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_film_and_video/toc/jfv.63.4.html)

In Red, White and Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms, Frank B. Wilderson III challenges readers to rethink current ideas on race, representation, and socially engaged cinema. Wilderson, associate professor of African American Studies and Drama at the University of California, Irvine, won the Hurston/ Wright Legacy Award and the American Book Award for his last book, Incognegro: A Memoir of Exile and Apartheid, and this follow-up provides important discourse on the ontology of blackness in the United States and how it relates to film. Wilderson’s central tenet is the impossibility of analogizing the suffering of black people with that of any other race or group of people since the continued gratuitous violence that characterizes black existence is found nowhere else in history. The structural, noncontingent violence on the black body and psyche has continued from the Middle Passage through slavery and the Jim Crow era and continuing on to today’s ghettos and prison-industrial complex. So although the meaning of suffering for whites (or non-blacks), with few exceptions, is based on issues of exploitation and alienation, the ontology of suffering for blacks is based on issues of “accumulation and fungibility” (14, original quote Saidiya Hartman). In Wilderson’s theory, this condition of being owned and traded is not simply an experience, like, for example, the experience of wage exploitation, but it is the essence and ontology of blackness. For Wilderson, this contrast in white and black essential positioning, and the white creation of and parasitism on the situation, is so polarizing that the relationship between whites and blacks, or “Masters and Slaves” (10), can only be considered an antagonism, as opposed to a negotiable, solvable conflict. Afro-pessimist theory is difficult and taxing for those who would like to imagine the relations between whites, blacks, and Native Americans as better-off, improving, or even fixable. Wilderson is neither simple nor soothing, with dense academic style and an unapologetic disinclination to posit solutions, as his conclusion addresses. “To say wemust be free of air, while admitting to knowing no other source of breath, is what I have tried to do here” (338). But Wilderson seems clear in his writing and in interviews that his book is intended as a way of opening up new avenues of dialogue on race in America, and readers will certainly find his work thought-provoking and worth the time it may take to process. Wilderson addresses the inability of most film and political theory to adequately portray the reality of the structures of these relations. He asserts that a new wave of theorists (bell hooks, James Snead, Manthia Diawara) improved Black film theory by taking the discussion beyond the realm of “positive/negative” (60) representations, working more importantly on interrogating film “as an apparatus or institution in relation to the derelict institutional status of Black people” (64). But Wilderson asserts that these theorists fail to address or recognize the utter impossibility of black agency in civil society’s institutions.

# 1nr

### AT: Don’t Have Hands On Levers Of Power

#### It doesn’t matter if we actually have our hands on the levers of power – the illusion of agency is productive

**Shove & Walker 7** Elizabeth Sociology @ Lancaster Gordon Geography @ Lancaster “CAUTION! Transitions ahead: politics, practice, and sustainable transition management” *Environment and Planning C* 39 (4)

For academic readers, our commentary argues for loosening the intellectual grip of ‘innovation studies’, for backing off from the nested, hierarchical multi-level model as the only model in town, and for exploring other social scientific, but also systemic theories of change. The more we think about the politics and practicalities of reflexive transition management, the more complex the process appears: for a policy audience, our words of caution could be read as an invitation to abandon the whole endeavour. If agency, predictability and legitimacy are as limited as we’ve suggested, this might be the only sensible conclusion.However, we are with Rip (2006) in recognising the value, productivity and everyday necessity of an ‘**illusion of agency’**, and of the working expectation that a difference can be made even in the face of so much evidence to the contrary. The outcomes of actions are unknowable, the system unsteerable and the effects of deliberate intervention inherently unpredictable and, ironically, it is this that sustains concepts of agency and management. As Rip argues ‘**illusions are productive** because they **motivate action** and repair work, and thus something (whatever) is achieved’ (Rip 2006: 94). Situated inside the systems they seek to influence, governance actors – and actors of other kinds as well - are part of the **dynamics of change**: even if they cannot steer from the outside they are **necessary to processes within**. This is, of course, also true of academic life. Here we are, busy critiquing and analysing transition management in the expectation that somebody somewhere is listening and maybe even taking notice. If we removed that illusion would we bother writing anything at all? Maybe we need such fictions to keep us going, and maybe – fiction or no - somewhere along the line something really does happen, but not in ways that we can anticipate or know.

#### They’re worse – strategies of absolute inclusivity *actively trade-off* with procedural deliberation necessary to affect structures- only our method threads the needle

Foreman ‘98 (Christopher Foreman is a nonresident senior fellow in Governance Studies. Since 2000, he has also been a professor and director of the social policy program at the University of Maryland’s School of Public Policy. His research focuses on the politics of health, race, environmental regulation, government reform, and domestic social policy, Ph.D. (1980), A.M. (1977), A.B. (1974), Harvard University, “The Promise and Peril of Environmental Justice”, 1998)

Its relatively congenial and accessible structure belies two basic limitations. One is that, like the environmental justice movement that inspired it, NEJAC is unable to define or focus on a set of policy priorities smaller than the full universe of federal, state, and local environmental justice issues. Painstakingly participatory in orientation, hopping among issues as they arise and ideas as they are generated, the council is a mechanism appropriate to conveying, and perhaps amplifying, demands, but not for deciding which ones deserve priority or how they should be compromised on behalf of other goals. like the October 1991 First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit, which yielded its seventeen principles of environmental justice through political and highly ideological accumulation rather than discriminating analysis, NEJAC is not the place to look for hard thinking about the boundaries of, or potential tradeoffs embedded in, environmental justice. The prevailing council view appears to be that all communities and all voices within them are more or less equally legitimate and deserving. Accordingly, their main concern is to enhance the overall "community presence" whenever and wherever possible. That, for example, is why the council successfully prodded the EPA to allow the creation of an indigenous peoples subcommittee in 1995; several NEJAC members had long been concerned that "issues important to indigenous peoples had not been addressed adequately by the existing committee structure of NEJAC."39 The council listens sympathetically to public comments and encourages the EPA or other agencies to take action. Its focus, especially within its subcommittees, is less on health or risk than on ferreting out and elevating community perspectives. But NEJAC eschews anything like a formal comparative assessment among the claims brought before it and there is no pressure from the EPA, or from anywhere else for that matter, for it to behave otherwise. Not surprisingly, NEJACs determination to achieve maximum inclusiveness can be procedurally debilitating at times. For example, in December 1996, at NEJACs eighth meeting in Baltimore, the public comment calendar was overcrowded, as is often the case; more than thirty individuals were signed up to speak. Chairman Moore, as usual, gently and repeatedly reminded both council members and the public of the "need to move along" to get through the list. But then a pair of Native American activists offered a rambling joint presentation that ended by calling for NEJAC to help free imprisoned activist Leonard Peltier, whom many observers have long believed to have been unjustly convicted for the murder of two FBI agents. The flow of public comment immediately halted as various council members (including chairman Moore) offered damning opinions regarding Peltier's incarceration. As the council began discussing what action it might appropriately take, no one dared venture what might appear obvious: that whatever the merits of Peltier's case, an EPA advisory council was simply an inappropriate forum in which to address that issue.

#### Occupy Wall street proves- it collapses into *factionalism* which turns their aff

White ’11 (Jeremy B. White, National Affairs reporter at International Business Times, “As Occupy Wall Street Expands, Tensions Mount Over Structure”, <http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/237339/20111025/occupy-wall-street-occupy-wall-street-structure-occupy-wall-street-general-assembly-occupy-wall-stre.htm?page=2>, October 25, 2011)

From the beginning, Occupy Wall Street has been committed to direct democracy. Anyone can participate in the General Assembly, the movement's main decision making body, by offering ideas or questioning other peoples' proposals. But that model is coming under strain as the still-nascent movement becomes more organized and maps a way forward. The last few weeks have seen a proliferation of working groups devoted to tasks that include managing food and supplies, coordinating community outreach and overseeing nearly $500,000 in donations. As the movement becomes larger and its structure grows more complex, protesters are debating ways to reform the General Assembly, which many veteran protesters say has become too unwieldy. "People are extremely frustrated with the process and how it is now," said protester Ronny Nunez. "The General Assemblies are great, they offer the ability for anyone to speak out, but there comes a point in which you have so many people involved in the process that it loses any sort of effectiveness." Nunez cited a recent General Assembly in which members of the sanitation working group sought emergency funding to purchase trash bins. Deliberations dragged on as people offered amendments, including a requirement that the protesters purchase their supplies secondhand, that "made it effectively impossible to get the funding they needed," Nunez said. Follow us "We're going through all these different growing pains where we're learning, and we're learning that some things work on a smaller level and some on a bigger level," Nunez said. Spokes Council Protesters are circulating a proposal to streamline the process with something called a Spokes Council. Under that model, the various working groups would nominate representatives to participate in the General Assembly on their behalf. The spokesperson would rotate, and during the General Assembly they would periodically conferring with their respective working groups, which would be seated behind them. The idea has already been blocked once in the General Assembly, but is set to come up again. A protester arrived at a recent meeting of the Outreach working group to explain the proposal. The current format had become "untenable," he argued. He noted that under the Spokes Council, anyone can join a working group and thereby have a say. "I think that's bulls-t," another protester responded, arguing that the idea endangered the movement's inclusiveness. "In participatory democracy," the protester presenting the idea shot back, "as long as you allow access at all times you've done your bit." Marisa Holmes, who on Monday night explained the Spokes Council idea during a meeting of the Structure working group, argued that the idea encouraged people to become more deeply invested in Occupy Wall Street by having them join working groups that are essential to the movement's day-to-day operations. Hours-long meetings where people debate the logistics of laundry, Holmes said, can vitiate the process by leading working groups to avoid the General Assembly altogether. "The General Assembly has been an amazing body for movement building, and it enables people to have a voice for what is sometimes the first time," Holmes said. "We don't want to destroy it but we see that there's a lot of work done in a not always accountable and transparent way." Dilemma: Preserve Participatory Structure or Become More-Efficient? The tension between people who want to preserve the movement's initial qualities and those who want to make it more efficient reflects an overlapping but different set of goals, said Todd Gitlin, a professor of journalism and communications at Columbia University who observed the evolution of an activist movement as president of Students for a Democratic Society. He said the movement will need to find a way to accommodate the "purists and pragmatists," or those for whom "the very participation is the goal" and those whose "goals have to do with moving the world." "You can think of this as the process by which a nation-state is formed," Gitlin said. "At one point anyone who shows up is a member, and then at another point those who have been members and have an appreciation for tasks to be done say 'wait a minute, we need to capitalize on our experience and value our continuity'... You're talking about the founding of some kind of functioning democracy, and the rules continue to evolve in nation-states, too." As that process unfolds, observers and members of the movement worry about the movement becoming fractured or co-opted. "My fundamental question is why would anyone in this movement, which is pro-democracy and pro-consensus, repeatedly bring up a proposal after it was already blocked, which is very divisive?" asked Etan Ben-Ami, a licensed social worker who is skeptical of the Spokes Council idea. "On the left we always have to guard what's occurred in the past frequently: takeovers by the vanguard left that infiltrates the process and pushes an agenda." On Monday night, Edward Ledford sat by the Structure working group, listening intently as Holmes explained the Spokes Council idea. Ledford, 61, had traveled from Lincoln, Nebraska armed with a plan, based on an obscure academic paper by a mathematician, for a series of deliberative juries that flow into a parliamentary body. Ledford spoke eloquently of the challenges Occupy Wall Street faces, repeatedly referencing James Madison's Federalist Paper No. 10, which warned presciently against the danger factionalism poses to democracy. Follow us "People do not seem to have learned their history. I see a very classical historical error unfolding," Ledford said, adding that he had seen "several red flags" in less than a day. "The movement has to be structured, but if it's structured in a bad way it is going to fail. Direct participatory democracy has in every instance, once it takes hold of a national institution, basically destroyed it because of its propensity to succumb to the violence of faction."

### AT: Roleplay State Bad

#### Roleplaying enables ideological becoming which strengthens our voices

Hanghoj ‘8 (Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, Since this PhD project began in 2004, the present author has been affiliated with DREAM (Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials), which is located at the Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. Research visits have taken place at the Centre for Learning, Knowledge, and Interactive Technologies (L-KIT), the Institute of Education at the University of Bristol and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab Denmark at the School of Education, University of Aarhus, where I currently work as an assistant professor, <http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information_til/Studerende_ved_SDU/Din_uddannelse/phd_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf>, 2008)

Thus, debate games require teachers to balance the centripetal/centrifugal forces of gaming and teaching, to be able to reconfigure their discursive authority, and to orchestrate the multiple voices of a dialogical game space in relation to particular goals. These Bakhtinian perspectives provide a valuable analytical framework for describing the discursive interplay between different practices and knowledge aspects when enacting (debate) game scenarios. In addition to this, Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy also offers an explanation of why debate games (and other game types) may be valuable within an educational context. One of the central features of multi-player games is that players are expected to experience a simultaneously real and imagined scenario both in relation to an insider’s (participant) perspective and to an outsider’s (co-participant) perspective. According to Bakhtin, the outsider’s perspective reflects a fundamental aspect of human understanding: In order to understand, it is immensely important for the person who understands to be located outside the object of his or her creative understanding – in time, in space, in culture. For one cannot even really see one's own exterior and comprehend it as a whole, and no mirrors or photographs can help; our real exterior can be seen and understood only by other people, because they are located outside us in space, and because they are others (Bakhtin, 1986: 7). As the quote suggests, every person is influenced by others in an inescapably intertwined way, and consequently no voice can be said to be isolated. Thus, it is in the interaction with other voices that individuals are able to reach understanding and find their own voice. Bakhtin also refers to the ontological process of finding a voice as “ideological becoming”, which represents “the process of selectively assimilating the words of others” (Bakhtin, 1981: 341). Thus, by teaching and playing debate scenarios, it is possible to support students in their process of becoming not only themselves, but also in becoming articulate and responsive citizens in a democratic society.

This is our internal link into our impacts- political specification is vital to creating an effective strategy

Silverstein ’02 (Marc, Anarchist Communitarian Network, “Breaking Free of the Protest Mentality”, 4-25,

<http://site.www.umb.edu/faculty/salzman_g/Strate/Discus/2002-04-25Silverstein.htm>)

But it seems that if a "movement" is going to be built, it needs a rational, comprehensive, holistic analysis of the current situation, and a **fleshed-out, detailed, practical strategy** to achieve whatever it is that happens to be its goals. The means must be consistent with the ends. This analysis and strategy would give direction to a movement and would act as a vehicle for personal and social transformation. What is alarming is the complete lack of any serious analysis or strategy, or even any concern over a lack of analysis or strategy, and the crowd's willingness, even eagerness to shout slogans, hold signs, and regurgitate the rhetoric of the speakers. Estimates for this march were put at 10-15,000 by the mainstream media and 75-100,000 by the independent media (both of whom exaggerate numbers to serve their particular agenda). Regardless, the march was in the tens of thousands. It seems that 50,000 people would be able to gather together and deliberate on a grassroots level, based on free association, through networks of affinity groups and spokes-councils, their strategic and organizational **plan of action**. Instead, those same 50,000 people chose to walk around as an amorphous mass, chanting, holding signs, letting the government know how bad and inhuman it is and how it should stop funding murderous states, and basically putting themselves in a humiliating position of powerlessness. Protestors are in the classic role of "protestors", people with no real power over their lives so they must demand it from the ruling class. Demonstrations also point to a lack of creativity; the only thing we can come up with is playing the song and dance of our rulers. How much longer will these protests go on for? If we could only get a few more tens of thousands to protest, will we be successful in overthrowing capitalism, the state and wage-slavery? Why do the state, capitalism and wage-slavery exist, why do the governments of the U.S. and Israel do what they do, and what are we actually going to do about it? One of the speakers, from a Muslim rights group, appealed to President Bush to warn Ariel Sharon that if he doesn't stop his war crimes, then immediate action will be taken. It is unbearably painful to witness such utter naivety. It is quite apparent that genocide and "war crimes" are normal functions of any state, that they are not doing anything irresponsible. The state will do anything to maintain its power, whether legal or illegal. Leftists and progressives point out that Israel has violated the Geneva Convention, and that their activity is "illegal". By accepting the false dichotomy of "legal"/"illegal" we are accepting their frame of reference and their world-view. We are viewing the situation from a liberal, idealistic perspective, of how the state is supposed to behave. Radicals and revolutionaries over a hundred years ago recognized the essential purpose of the state and capitalism, they weren't fooled by it, and they weren't sucked in by reformism. It seems we are a long way to go to reach the same logical conclusions that were reached in the 1870s! There seems to be a lack of prefigurative politics, or even an understanding of what that means. Prefigurative politics is based on the notion that the "future society" is how we act in the present, what kinds of interactions, processes, structures, institutions, and associations we create right now, and how we live our lives. The notion that we just need more people, more resources, and more money to be channeled into these protests is utterly naïve, because it mistakes the problem as being quantitative, when in fact it is qualitative. The qualitative component deals with how we treat each other, the quality of people's lives, meeting individual wants and preferences, strengthening our ability to clearly and honestly communicate with each other our concerns, needs, feelings, and requests, in the context of a small-scale face-to-face environment. On the other hand, protests are mostly concerned with numbers, masses, and large, bureaucratized organizations, concerns which all too often ignore the crucial individual and inter-personal aspects. The protests against the G-8 conference last July in Genoa, Italy included up to 200,000 demonstrators, yet the only outcomes of the protest were a militarized police state bordering on fascism (or perhaps fascist), one dead, and many imprisoned and seriously injured. The strategy of protest doesn't seem to be getting us anywhere, so it is a wonder why people continue to engage in this failed tactic. If a methodology is proven time and time again of not being successful, then the rational response would be to critically examine the inadequacies of the unsuccessful methodology, and creatively and collectively think up and experiment with new methodologies. The few instances when these mass demonstrations are critiqued, they are rarely ever rejected in toto; instead the solution is to have protests on the level of local communities and neighborhoods, rather than mass convergences to large cities. Their argument is that this would bridge the gap between activists and "regular people" and get more people active and radicalized in their local communities, and to have a more secure base of resistance. But the size of the protests are not the real problem, the real problem is the protest mentality itself, which remains qualitatively the same whether it's in a working-class neighborhood or in a major city. Most of the corporate media reported that the protests were overwhelmingly "peaceful", and many of the protestors were quite content with this. Both sides accept the dichotomy of "peaceful"/"violent", just as they accept the dichotomy of "legal"/"illegal". This traps them into a moralistic, Statist mindset. Even the militant black bloc in past protests has never failed to mention that "property destruction is not violence", which indicates that they still accept this basic duality. The media are our enemy, their interests are antithetical to ours, and to hope for any kind of "positive coverage" is pie in the sky. We should not be surprised if the police beat and arrest us, if the media defame us, and if the general public hate us. That is to be expected, and we should start to recognize this and move on. There doesn't seem to be so much a "movement" as there is a collection of divergent tendencies and ideologies, many of them incompatible with each other. With every protest, there has been very little attention to what we hope to achieve, and the claim that all protests, demonstrations, marches and rallies are useless and counter-productive is a new and shocking concept for most activists. The reason that the vast majority of "ordinary people" view us with fear and contempt is because we have nothing to offer them. The power of capitalism and the State does not exist in the streets, in blocking and shutting down major intersections. It exists in the everyday lives of people, more specifically: in their homes, workplaces, and communities. If we don't work on creating **practical alternatives** to the capitalist system, then it is no wonder most people won't join us - we don't offer them anything, and our petty squabbles are totally irrelevant to their lives. The strategy I propose is of creating spheres of autonomy and self-sufficiency based on free association and common preference finding: bolos, temporary and permanent autonomous zones, counter-institutions, popular assemblies (see: http://www.ipsnews.net/interna.asp?idnews=8614 for a contemporary example), small-scale decentralized agriculture, community gardens en masse, guilds, kibbutzes, worker-owned cooperatives, squats, local barter clubs (which have been popping up throughout parts of Argentina, see: http://www.infoshop.org/inews/stories.php? story=02/03/02/5676701, communist stores (based on the principle of "take what you need, donate what you can"), co-housing, urban and rural intentional communities, alternative and sustainable technology, computer-linked networks for co-ordinating and making decisions on a large-scale basis. Computer-linked networks may in fact supercede entirely the need for popular assemblies. The reason that creating these types of anti-authoritarian structures is a much more worthwhile strategy than protest and direct confrontation with the State is because it hits the State and capitalism where it hurts. Food Not Bombs, Independent Media Centers, micro-radio and the like are also important, but they don't provide people with food, clothing, and housing - that is, the real necessities of life. The Black Panthers' Party in the 1960s and 70s set up free breakfast and lunch programs for neighborhood kids, community medical clinics, and self-defense classes. The fact that these counter-institutions triggered so much State repression, sometimes more so than armed struggle, shows how effective and threatening they were to the State. Keith Preston, in "Anarchism or Anarcho-Social Democracy?", writes: "Strategically, we need to follow the example of the most successful anarchist forces of all time- the Spanish anarchist revolutionaries. Our revolutionary agenda should be to develop an alliance of community organizations, unions, cooperatives, enterprises, service organizations, youth clubs, study groups and other popular associations". What I've sketched above are just a few outlines of a strategy, described abstractly, which embodies the kind of direction I think we should be going in. The protest mentality is getting us nowhere, it is a strategy of powerlessness - it is not "what democracy looks like". If we are serious about doing away with this rotten system and living in a new way, we have to know what it is that we don't want, **what it is we do want, and how to go about getting what we want.** What we need is a new, radical, concrete, utopian praxis, free of the failed methodologies of Leftism, activism and protest.

#### Theoretical remedies are insufficient- policy expertise is key to solve

McClean ‘1 (David E. “The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope,” Am. Phil. Conf., [www.american-philosophy.org/archives/past\_conference\_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david\_mcclean.htm](http://www.american-philosophy.org/archives/past_conference_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david_mcclean.htm))

Yet for some reason, at least partially explicated in Richard Rorty's Achieving Our Country, a book that I think is long overdue, leftist critics continue to cite and refer to the eccentric and often a priori ruminations of people like those just mentioned, and a litany of others including Derrida, Deleuze, Lyotard, Jameson, and Lacan, who are to me hugely more irrelevant than Habermas in their narrative attempts to suggest policy prescriptions (when they actually do suggest them) aimed at curing the ills of homelessness, poverty, market greed, national belligerence and racism. I would like to suggest that it is time for American social critics who are enamored with this group, those who actually want to be relevant, to recognize that they have a disease, and a disease regarding which I myself must remember to stay faithful to my own twelve step program of recovery. The disease is the need for elaborate theoretical "remedies" wrapped in neological and multi-syllabic jargon. These elaborate theoretical remedies are more "interesting," to be sure, than the pragmatically settled questions about what shape democracy should take in various contexts, or whether private property should be protected by the state, or regarding our basic human nature (described, if not defined (heaven forbid!), in such statements as "We don't like to starve" and "We like to speak our minds without fear of death" and "We like to keep our children safe from poverty"). As Rorty puts it, "When one of today's academic leftists says that some topic has been 'inadequately theorized,' you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either philosophy of language, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist version of economic determinism. . . . These futile attempts to philosophize one's way into political relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left retreats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach to the problems of its country. Disengagement from practice produces theoretical hallucinations"(italics mine).(1) Or as John Dewey put it in his The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, "I believe that philosophy in America will be lost between chewing a historical cud long since reduced to woody fiber, or an apologetics for lost causes, . . . . or a scholastic, schematic formalism, unless it can somehow bring to consciousness America's own needs and its own implicit principle of successful action." Those who suffer or have suffered from this disease Rorty refers to as the Cultural Left, which left is juxtaposed to the Political Left that Rorty prefers and prefers for good reason. Another attribute of the Cultural Left is that its members fancy themselves pure culture critics who view the successes of America and the West, rather than some of the barbarous methods for achieving those successes, as mostly evil, and who view anything like national pride as equally evil even when that pride is tempered with the knowledge and admission of the nation's shortcomings. In other words, the Cultural Left, in this country, too often dismiss American society as beyond reform and redemption. And Rorty correctly argues that this is a disastrous conclusion, i.e. disastrous for the Cultural Left. I think it may also be disastrous for our social hopes, as I will explain. Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury some of their cynicism about America's social and political prospects and help forge public and political possibilities in a spirit of determination to, indeed, achieve our country - the country of Jefferson and King; the country of John Dewey and Malcom X; the country of Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard Rustin, and of the later George Wallace and the later Barry Goldwater. To invoke the words of King, and with reference to the American society, the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create the "beloved community," one woven with the thread of agape into a conceptually single yet diverse tapestry that shoots for nothing less than a true intra-American cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein both same sex unions and faith-based initiatives will be able to be part of the same social reality, one wherein business interests and the university are not seen as belonging to two separate galaxies but as part of the same answer to the threat of social and ethical nihilism. We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of public intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to move past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the prospect of our flourishing - questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the character of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the fantasy of a missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one member in a community of nations under a "law of peoples?" The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power (all of which can still be done from our arm chairs.) This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian social institutions, into the grimy pragmatic details where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly understand how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their overthrow commences. This might help keep us from being slapped down in debates by true policy pros who actually know what they are talking about but who lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class."

### AT: You Privilege Styles

#### Our model of debate doesn’t trade-off with personal conviction or require you detach yourself from your agency

Hodson ‘9 (Derek Hodson, Professor of Education – Ontario Institute for Studies @ University of Toronto, ‘9

(Derek, “Towards an Action-oriented Science Curriculum,” Journal for Activist Science & Technology Education, Vol. 1, No. 1)

\*\*note: SSI = socioscientific issues

Politicization of science education can be achieved by giving students the opportunity to confront real world issues that have a scientific, technological or environmental dimension**.** By grounding content in socially and personally relevant contexts, an issues-based approach can provide the motivation that is absent from current abstract, de-contextualized approaches and can form a base from which students can construct understanding that is personally relevant, meaningful and important. It can provide increased opportunities for active learning, inquiry-based learning, collaborative learning and direct experience of the situatedness and multidimensionality of scientific and technological practice. In the Western contemporary world, technology is all pervasive; its social and environmental impact is clear; its disconcerting social implications and disturbing moral-ethical dilemmas are made apparent almost every day in popular newspapers, TV news bulletins and Internet postings. In many ways, it is much easier to recognize how technology is determined by the sociocultural context in which it is located than to see how science is driven by such factors. It is much easier to see the environmental impact of technology than to see the ways in which science impacts on society and environment. For these kinds of reasons, it makes good sense to use problems and issues in technology and engineering as the major vehicles for contextualizing the science curriculum. This is categorically not an argument against teaching science; rather, it is an argument for teaching the science that informs an understanding of everyday technological problems and may assist students in reaching tentative solutions about where they stand on key SSI.

#### Policy simulation key to creativity and decisionmaking—the cautious detachment that they criticize is key to its revolutionary benefits

Eijkman 12

The role of simulations in the authentic learning for national security policy development: Implications for Practice / Dr. Henk Simon Eijkman. [electronic resource] <http://nsc.anu.edu.au/test/documents/Sims_in_authentic_learning_report.pdf>. Dr Henk Eijkman is currently an independent consultant as well as visiting fellow at the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy and is Visiting Professor of Academic Development, Annasaheb Dange College of Engineering and Technology in India. As a sociologist he developed an active interest in tertiary learning and teaching with a focus on socially inclusive innovation and culture change. He has taught at various institutions in the social sciences and his work as an adult learning specialist has taken him to South Africa, Malaysia, Palestine, and India. He publishes widely in international journals, serves on Conference Committees and editorial boards of edited books and international journal

Policy simulations stimulate Creativity Participation in policy games has proved to be a highly effective way of developing new combinations of experience and creativity, which is precisely what innovation requires (Geurts et al. 2007: 548). Gaming, whether in analog or digital mode, has the power to stimulate creativity, and is one of the most engaging and liberating ways for making group work productive, challenging and enjoyable. Geurts et al. (2007) cite one instance where, in a National Health Care policy change environment, ‘the many parties involved accepted the invitation to participate in what was a revolutionary and politically very sensitive experiment precisely because it was a game’ (Geurts et al. 2007: 547). Data from other policy simulations also indicate the uncovering of issues of which participants were not aware, the emergence of new ideas not anticipated, and a perception that policy simulations are also an enjoyable way to formulate strategy (Geurts et al. 2007). Gaming puts the players in an ‘experiential learning’ situation, where they discover a concrete, realistic and complex initial situation, and the gaming process of going through multiple learning cycles helps them work through the situation as it unfolds. Policy gaming stimulates ‘learning how to learn’, as in a game, and learning by doing alternates with reflection and discussion. The progression through learning cycles can also be much faster than in real-life (Geurts et al. 2007: 548). The bottom line is that problem solving in policy development processes requires creative experimentation. This cannot be primarily taught via ‘camp-fire’ story telling learning mode but demands hands-on ‘veld learning’ that allow for safe creative and productive experimentation. This is exactly what good policy simulations provide (De Geus, 1997; Ringland, 2006). In simulations participants cannot view issues solely from either their own perspective or that of one dominant stakeholder (Geurts et al. 2007). Policy simulations enable the seeking of Consensus Games are popular because historically people seek and enjoy the tension of competition, positive rivalry and the procedural justice of impartiality in safe and regulated environments. As in games, simulations temporarily remove the participants from their daily routines, political pressures, and the restrictions of real-life protocols. In consensus building, participants engage in extensive debate and need to act on a shared set of meanings and beliefs to guide the policy process in the desired direction

That allows us to influence state policy AND is key to agency

Eijkman 12

The role of simulations in the authentic learning for national security policy development: Implications for Practice / Dr. Henk Simon Eijkman. [electronic resource] <http://nsc.anu.edu.au/test/documents/Sims_in_authentic_learning_report.pdf>. Dr Henk Eijkman is currently an independent consultant as well as visiting fellow at the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy and is Visiting Professor of Academic Development, Annasaheb Dange College of Engineering and Technology in India. As a sociologist he developed an active interest in tertiary learning and teaching with a focus on socially inclusive innovation and culture change. He has taught at various institutions in the social sciences and his work as an adult learning specialist has taken him to South Africa, Malaysia, Palestine, and India. He publishes widely in international journals, serves on Conference Committees and editorial boards of edited books and international journal

However, whether as an approach to learning, innovation, persuasion or culture shift, policy simulations derive their power from two central features: their combination of simulation and gaming (Geurts et al. 2007). 1. The simulation element: the unique combination of simulation with role-playing. The unique simulation/role-play mix enables participants to create possible futures relevant to the topic being studied. This is diametrically opposed to the more traditional, teacher-centric approaches in which a future is produced for them. In policy simulations, possible futures are much more than an object of tabletop discussion and verbal speculation. ‘No other technique allows a group of participants to engage in collective action in a safe environment to create and analyse the futures they want to explore’ (Geurts et al. 2007: 536). 2. The game element: the interactive and tailor-made modelling and design of the policy game. The actual run of the policy simulation is only one step, though a most important and visible one, in a collective process of investigation, communication, and evaluation of performance. In the context of a post-graduate course in public policy development, for example, a policy simulation is a dedicated game constructed in collaboration with practitioners to achieve a high level of proficiency in relevant aspects of the policy development process. To drill down to a level of finer detail, policy development simulations—as forms of interactive or participatory modelling— are particularly effective in developing participant knowledge and skills in the five key areas of the policy development process (and success criteria), namely: Complexity, Communication, Creativity, Consensus, and Commitment to action (‘the five Cs’). The capacity to provide effective learning support in these five categories has proved to be particularly helpful in strategic decision-making (Geurts et al. 2007). Annexure 2.5 contains a detailed description, in table format, of the synopsis below

### 2NC Energy SSD Good

#### Switch-side debate is vital for deliberative policy making on energy issues

Stevenson ‘9 (Stevenson, PhD, senior lecturer and independent consultant – Graduate School of the Environment @ Centre for Alternative Technology, ‘9 (Ruth, “Discourse, power, and energy conflicts: understanding Welsh renewable energy planning policy,” *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy*, Volume 27, p. 512-526)

It could be argued that this result arose from the lack of expertise of the convenors of the TAN 8 in consensual decision making. Indeed, there is now more research and advice on popular participation in policy issues at a community level (eg Kaner et al, 1996; Ostrom, 1995; Paddison, 1999). However, for policy making the state remains the vehicle through which policy goals must be achieved (Rydin, 2003) and it is through the state that global issues such as climate change and sustainable development must be legislated for, and to some extent enacted. It is therefore through this structure that any consensual decision making must be tested. This research indicates that the policy process cannot actually overcome contradictions and conflict. Instead, **encompassing them may well be a more fruitful way forward than attempts at consensus.** Foucault reinforces the notion that the `field of power' can prove to be positive both for individuals and for the state by allowing both to act (Darier, 1996; Foucault, 1979). Rydin (2003) suggests that actors can be involved in policy making but through `deliberative' policy making rather than aiming for consensus: ``the key to success here is not consensus but building a position based on divergent positions'' (page 69). Deliberative policy making for Rydin involves: particular dialogic mechanisms such as speakers being explicit about their values, understandings, and activities: the need to move back and forth between memories (historical) and aspirations (future); moving between general and the particular; and the adoption of role taking (sometimes someone else's role). There is much to be trialed and tested in these deliberative models, however, a strong state is still required as part of the equation if we are to work in the interests of global equity, at least until the messages about climate change and sustainable development are strong enough to filter through to the local level. It is at the policy level that the usefulness of these various new techniques of deliberative policy making must be tested, and at the heart of this must be an understanding of the power rationalities at work in the process.